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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
Yan Lin 
Old Dominion University, 2004 
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung
This dissertation includes three essays that study on Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs). The first essay examines the shape o f market demand curve by employing REIT 
equity fund flows as a proxy for REIT aggregate demand. An empirical framework is 
introduced to disentangle the price-pressure effect and the information effect. We do not 
find evidence for the price-pressure effect, which states that REIT equity fund flows 
directly affect REIT market prices. Instead, we find that the performance o f REIT market 
prices does influence REIT equity fund flows. The results indicate that investors adjust 
their demand for REITs by investigating and forecasting REIT fundamentals. Thus om 
findings support the horizontal market demand curve for REITs.
The second essay examines the time varying risk premium for equity REITs with 
both GARCH and GARCH-M specifications. Using a daily data set from June 1995 to 
September 2002, we find that both the ARCH and GARCH effects are significant for our 
estimations. The results show that the market returns and the first order autocorrelation 
help explain the excess returns o f equity REITs. However, the movement o f interest rates 
contributes to equity REIT returns only when the market returns are not considered at the 
same time. Finally, the GARCH-M terms are not significant in determining the expected 
returns.
The third essay investigates the effects o f investor sentiment and institutional 
ownership on REIT risk premium. Our results show that REIT risk premium is negatively 
related to investor sentiment. That is, REIT risk premium increases (decreases) when 
investors become irrationally optimistic (pessimistic). However, we do not find any 
significant relation between REIT risk premium and institutional ownership changes 
except for small-size REITs. The results are robust when we include other control 
variables in the analysis. We also find evidence that the information contained in past 
investor sentiment changes has an impact on subsequent REIT risk premium. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
information contained in past institutional ownership changes, however, only affects 
REIT risk premium in the time period between 1994 and 1998, and for the good 
performing REITs.
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INTRODUCTION
Direct investments in real estate can be time consuming and/or expensive. With 
the passage o f the Real Estate Investment Trust Act o f 1960, the opportunity to invest in 
real estate has been made available to small investors. A Real Estate Investment Trust 
(REIT) is a closed-end investment company, which offers investors the opportunity to 
invest in real estate related assets (i.e., income producing real estate properties and 
mortgages). REITs are usually categorized into different types. Equity REITs invest at 
least 75% of their total assets in income producing real estate properties. Mortgage REITs 
invest at least 75% of their assets in residential mortgages, short- and long-term 
construction loans and mortgages on commercial properties. Hybrid REITs both own 
properties and make loans to real estate owners and operators. REIT companies are 
legally required to pay virtually all o f their taxable income (90%) to its shareholders 
every year.
Even though REITs have a history back to I960, they had played a very limited 
role in real estate investment for more than three decades. The Tax Reform Act o f 1986 
radically changed the real estate investment landscape and triggered the dramatic growth 
o f REITs. It not only drastically reduced the potential for real estate investment to 
generate tax shelter opportunities, but also empowered REITs. The Act permitted REITs 
to own and to operate and manage most types o f income-producing commercial 
properties \  The equity market capitalization for REITs in 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 
are $1.5, 2.4, 13.0, and 154.9 billion, respectively. The most significant growth happened 
after 1992.
Given the significant growth o f REITs in the past few decades, this dissertation 
investigates three perspectives o f the REIT industry. First o f all, we examine the market 
demand curve for REITs. A market demand curve represents the relation between price 
and quantity for a certain product. There are three types o f market demand curve: 
downward sloping, horizontal, and upward sloping. For securities, the question is 
centered on whether market demand curve is downward sloping or horizontal. A 
horizontal market demand curve means investors can buy and sell any amount o f a firm’s
' Source; National Association o f Real Estate Investment Trusts.
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equity without significantly affecting the price. A downward sloping demand curve 
means larger amount o f trading is associated with lower price. The assumption of a 
horizontal market demand curve is very important for many finance theories. Answer for 
this question has remained inconclusive. Almost all previous studies focus on common 
stocks. The first essay examines the shape of REIT market demand curve by employing 
REIT equity fund flows as a proxy for REIT aggregate demand. The findings support the 
horizontal market demand curve for REITs.
The second essay examines the time varying risk premium for equity REITs with 
both GARCH and GARCH-M models using daily data from June 1995 to September 
2002. The equity REITs have dominated the REIT industry since late 1980s. 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models are specifically designed 
to model and forecast conditional variances. The variance o f the dependent variable is 
modeled as a function o f past values o f the dependent variable and independent, or 
exogenous variables. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model introduces the past period's forecast variances to the ARCH model. A 
GARCH-in-Mean (GARCH-M) model introduces the conditional variance into the mean 
equation. The GARCH-M model is often used in financial applications where the 
expected returns on an asset are related to the expected asset risk, that is, the estimated 
coefficient on the expected risk is a measure o f the risk-retum tradeoff. The research on 
the time varying risk premium for REITs has been rare. Our results indicate that both 
ARCH and GARCH effects in the volatility equation are significant for equity REITs. 
However, we find that the GARCH-M terms are not significant in determining the 
expected returns for equity REITs.
The third essay investigates the effects o f investor sentiment and institutional 
ownership on REIT risk premium. Investor sentiment is described as the unpredictability 
o f the opinions o f not-fully-rational investors. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmaim (1990) argue that investor sentiment impounds resale price risk on the assets 
they trade. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) use closed-end fund discounts as a proxy for 
individual investor sentiment since individual investors are more likely to hold and trade 
closed-end funds than the underlying assets in the funds’ portfolio. On the other hand, the 
REIT equity premium could also be affected by the behavior o f rational investors. It has
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
been found in the literature that institutional trading does affect stock returns (e.g., 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1992, Nofsinger and Sias 1999). Our results from the 
third essay show that REIT risk premium is negatively related to investor sentiment. That 
is, REIT risk premium increases (decreases) when investors become irrationally 
optimistic (pessimistic). However, we do not find any significant relation between REIT 
risk premium and institutional ownership changes except for small-size REITs. The 
results are robust when we include other control variables in the analysis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ESSAY 1. THE MARKET DEM AND CURVE FOR REITS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Whether the market demand curve is downward sloping is a critical issue in 
financial market research, since many finance propositions (e.g., CAPM or APT, 
Modigliani-Miller theorem) are implicitly based on the assumption o f a horizontal 
demand curve. That is, investor can buy and sell any amount o f a firm’s equity without 
significantly affecting the price. The issue is also important for practical side o f the 
market. Investors (especially portfolio managers who are able to trade stocks in large 
amount) could understand their influence on the stock prices better if  they have a clearer 
idea of the shape of market demand curve.
Most previous studies focus on the demand curve o f common stocks. In this 
essay, we examine the demand curve o f a specially designed security: Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs), a type o f closed-end investment company. Investing in real 
estate is attractive for diversification purpose as real estate has a much lower standard 
deviation, and either low positive or negative correlations with other asset classes in a 
portfolio context (Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1990). Knowing the characteristics o f REIT 
demand curve will not only add to the demand curve literature, it also will benefit the 
practitioners by providing theoretical support for their investment decisions.
1.1.1 Literature Review
Studies on the market demand curve have been done on both individual firms’ 
stock (e.g., Scholes 1972) and aggregate securities (e.g., Cha and Lee 2001). Three main 
hypotheses have been tested in literature.
The substitution hypothesis (SH) proposed by Scholes (1972) is consistent with 
the efficient market hypothesis, which states that security prices reflect all publicly 
available information. Since assets are substitutes in investor portfolios, the pure price 
effects o f corporate new issues or investor purchases and sales must be very small. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
excess demand for a single security will be very elastic. Demand curve is essentially 
horizontal.
In contrast to the substitution hypothesis, the price-pressure hypothesis (PPH) 
argues that security prices are affected by temporary changes in demand. For example, 
when there is a large trade o f a security (e.g., large block sales), the larger the trade of 
securities, the larger the price effect and consequently the larger the expected rate of 
returns subsequent to the trade. Thus demand curve for a firm’s shares is downward 
sloping.
The third hypothesis, the information hypothesis (IH), was provided as a 
resolution o f some o f the differences between the above two hypotheses. It states the 
trades used to investigate market demand curve are always accompanied with some kind 
o f information contents. So when a large stock trade happens in the market, we would 
expect to see either an upward or a downward price adjustment in the price o f the stock. 
This permanent adjustment is because of the information contained in that trade.
Using large-block sales o f stock, Scholes (1972) gets results inconsistent with the 
price-pressure hypothesis. At the same time, his results support the substitution 
hypothesis and information hypothesis. Several other studies stay in line with his 
findings. With data on new issues o f utility stocks traded on the NYSE, Hess and Frost 
(1982) find that stock returns seem to be uncorrelated with the size o f the issue. 
Interestingly, Kalay and Shimrat (1987) find that a significant negative effect caused by 
new equity issues is not unique on stock prices, the bond prices also suffer such negative 
effect. They reject the price-pressure hypothesis, since it does not predict a decline in 
bond prices when the quantity o f corporate bond is not increased. They conclude the 
significant drop in bond price is consistent with the information-release hypothesis. Other 
studies (e.g., Jain 1987, Sanger and Peterson 1990) also find little evidence for downward 
sloping market demand curve. Cha and Lee (2001) examine the aggregate demand curve 
for the stock market index portfolio. Their results also are consistent with a horizontal 
market demand curve.
Like many other finance topics, the answer to this question remains inconclusive. 
Some studies do report evidence in favor o f the price-pressure effect. For example, Harris 
and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) find that stocks newly included in the S&P 500
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the announcement of the 
inclusion. They interpreted it as evidence of the price-pressure hypothesis and downward 
sloping common stock demand curve. Examining actual changes in institutional holdings 
following both inclusion and exclusion from the S&P 500 index, Pruitt and Wei (1989) 
also provide results for the price-pressure effect and downward sloping demand curves 
for stocks.
Daviddon, Chhachhi, and Glascock (1996), among others, report mixed results. 
They get results consistent with both information effect and price-pressure effect when 
investigate tender offer stock repurchase announcement. They argue that the positive 
abnormal returns occurring just prior to and at the time o f the tender offer repurchase 
announcement is largely an information effect. However, the large increase in volume at 
the time o f the announcement until expiration and the negative abnormal returns at 
expiration are evidence for price-pressure effect.
On the methodology issue, Harris and Gurel (1986) propose two approaches to 
test the various price response hypotheses. One is to measure the informational price 
effect o f information-bearing transaction; the other is to focus on events that are unlikely 
to convey new information to the market. Many researchers have adopted the latter 
approach. Large-block trade event has been examined by Scholes (1972), Kraus and Stoll 
(1972), among others. Changes in the S&P 500 index list is another popular event, since 
the criteria for inclusion of S&P 500 index are public information and none o f these 
criteria is concerned with the future performance o f the firm (Shleifer 1986). Harris and 
Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), Pruitt and Wei (1989), Jain (1987), Sanger and Peterson 
(1990) all belong to this category. Cha and Lee (2001) try the former approach, which 
needs a measure o f the information price effect. They argue that a horizontal aggregate 
demand curve is a sufficient condition for horizontal individual demand curve, since the 
upward sloping demand curve for some individual stocks is very unlikely.
Nearly all the previous researches focus on common stock market demand curve. 
In contrast, we pay attention to a special designed investment sector: REITs. We haven’t 
seen such studies in literature. Since real estate has a much lower standard deviation, and 
either low positive or negative correlations with other asset classes (Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson 1990), real estate investment is ideal for asset diversification. Learning the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
demand curve shape o f REITs will add to the literature by providing evidence o f 
securities other than common stocks. It will also help practitioners to better understand 
their managerial strategies. If we find that the REIT demand curve is horizontal, it means 
the investors cannot get the power for market. They cannot influence the market price by 
buying or selling the REITs. If  our results support a downward sloping REIT demand 
curve, it may be possible for investors to move market price by trading REITs.
Since it is very difficult to find a pure event that does not contain any information, 
we follow the first methodology approach stated earlier, which identifies and measures 
both the information effect and the priee-pressure effect. We also examine the relation 
between REIT equity fund flows and REIT market returns in order to provide further 
evidence on the REIT demand curve.
1.1.2 The Growth of REIT Industry
As we have mentioned earlier, the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 had radically changed 
the real estate investment landscape and triggered the dramatic growth o f REITs. The Act 
not only made real estate investments ineome-oriented instead o f tax-shelter-oriented, it 
also permitted REITs to operate and manage various types o f income-producing 
commercial properties. Figure 1.1 provides the overview o f the REIT industry since 
1971.
[Insert Figure 1.1 here]
Although the number o f REITs at the beginning of twenty-first century was only 
about four times as many as that o f early 1970s, the REIT equity market capitalization 
had increased tremendously. The REIT equity market capitalization in 1971, 1981, 1991, 
and 2001 are $1.5, 2.4, 13.0, and 154.9 billion, respectively. The most significant growth 
occurred after 1992. The capitalization rocked while the number o f REITs showed a 
declining trend. The capitalization grew from $32.2 billion in 1993 to $154.9 billion in 
2001, with an annual compounded growth rate o f 21.7%.
Such a huge capital inflow into the REIT industry makes it an ideal ease to study 
REIT market demand curve in addition to the reasons we mentioned earlier. Do the REIT 
fund flows spur the REIT prices, or does REIT market performance attract such huge
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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fund inflow? Specifically, we want to know whether the shape o f REIT demand curve is 
horizontal or downward sloping.
Our findings reject the price-pressure effect on REITs. The results show that 
REIT equity fund flows seem to be influenced by the performance o f REIT market index; 
however, REIT equity fund flows do not affect REIT market index directly. Our results 
are consistent with a horizontal market demand curve for REITs.
The next section presents two empirical frameworks used to examine the REIT 
market demand curve. Section three describes our data. Section four provides empirical 
results. The last section summarizes the essay.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1.2 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present two methodologies to examine the REIT demand 
curve. The first one is a VAR approach, which identifies and measures the information 
effect and price pressure effect directly. The second method is Granger-causality test, 
which investigates the relation between REIT equity fund flows and REIT market 
returns.
1.2 .1 Measuring the Information Effect and the Price-pressure Effect
According to Harrris and Gurel (1986), the price-pressure hypothesis can be 
tested by either measuring the informational price effect of possible information-carrying 
transaction or examining events that are unlikely to convey new information to the 
market. Since it is very difficult to find events that fit the no-information requirement, we 
try the former approach by introducing a framework that takes into account both the 
information effect and the price-pressure effect.
In an efficient market, only cash flows and changes in expected retums can affect 
security prices. Thus we test whether equity fund flows directly affect REIT prices (or 
retums) in the presence o f the expected future cash flows and/or changes in expected 
retums. We start with the log-linear dividend-price ratio model o f Campbell and Shiller 
(1988), which is derived by taking a first-order Taylor approximation o f the equation 
defining the log stock retum {ht =log [{Pt +Df)/ Pt-j]). The model was further developed 
into an equation that relates the unexpected stock retums to changes in rational 
expectations o f future dividend growth and future stock retums in Campbell (I99I). In 
this equation, stock retums in period t {ht) is the sum of expected stock retums {Et-i {ht)) 
and unexpected retums; the latter include unexpected changes in rational expectations of 
current and future growth in cash flows and future stock retums.
h, =E,_,h, , (1.1)
7=0 7=0
where ht denotes the log retums on a stock held from the end of period t-1 to the end of 
period t, dt denotes the log cash flows paid during period t, Et denotes an expectation 
formed at the end o f period t, A denotes a difference operator (e.g., A A; = h f  ht-i), and p
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is a discount parameter a little smaller than one, which means that an increase in stock 
retums expected in the distance future is associated with a smaller drop in current stock 
price than is an increase in stock retums expected in the near future. The equation can be 
rewritten as
= (E ,-E ,_ ,- ) 'Z p 'A d ,,,  , ( 1 .2 )
7=0 y=o
where the unexpected changes in rational expectations o f changes in cash flows equal the 
vmexpected changes in rational expectations o f future stock retums.
The model above implies that equity fund flows should affect security market 
retums to the extent that they affect current and future changes in cash flows and/or 
changes in expected retums. Thus it provides an altemative test o f the information price 
effect. We can separate the effect o f the equity fund flows on the security market retums 
into two parts: one is direct effect; the other is indirect effect through affecting either 
current / future changes in cash flows or changes in expected retums. Thus we have
7=0
7=0 (1.3)
= (1 - B)(E, -  E , _ , p > h d „ ,  + e(E, -  )% p 'h e f f„ i
7=0 7=0
and
h, = E,_,h, -  (E, -  E,_, p ‘h,^j + (1 -  B'AE, -  E,_, ) £  p ‘Ad,„
7=1 7=0
+ 0(E ,-E ,_ ,)f^p> A < ^f„ j , (1.4)
7=0
where denotes log REIT equity fund flows. Equation (1.4) states that the stock
retums are the sum of four parts: expected stock retums, unexpected changes in rational 
expectations o f future stock retums (the expected retum effect), unexpected changes in 
rational expectations o f current/future cash flows with weight (1- ^  (the cash-flow 
effect), and unexpected changes in rational expectations o f current/future equity fund 
flows with weight G (the price-pressure effect).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Since we constrain that the cash-flow effeet and the price-pressure effect sum to 
one, we can identify and estimate the price-pressure effeet by solving one equation in one 
unknown parameter 0.
If  we loose the restriction on the weights o f cash-flow effect and price-pressure 
effect, we get
= ( £ , ,  (1.5)
7=0 7=0 7=0
where we assume that the expected retum effect and the cash-flow effect are symmetric 
so that we do not allow for differential effeets o f equity fund flows on revisions in 
expected cash flows and on revisions in expected retums. Therefore, the price-pressure 
effect in this model is measured by the parameter 7 . The Appendix describes how the 
VAR process identifies and estimates the parameters 0 and 7
1.2.2 The Relation betw een REIT Equity Fund Flows and REIT M arket Retum s
We now tum to the methodology that can examine whether equity fund flows 
directly affect security market retums. The contemporaneous and lagged correlations 
between equity fund flows and retums have been examined by some researchers. For 
example, Warther (1995) finds that aggregate security retums are highly correlated with 
eoncurrent unexpected cash flows into mutual funds but unrelated to eoncurrent expected 
cash flows. Cha and Lee (2001) find that market retums do help explain equity fimd 
flows but not the reverse.
The test o f whether equity fimd flows contain additional information about 
security market retums can be done in two ways. First, examine the relation between 
REIT equity fund flows and REIT market retums without conceming other variables. 
Second, allow the presence of market fundamentals such as eamings, dividend, and 
discount rates in the investigation between equity fimd flows and security market retums.
We examine the information content by adopting Granger-causality test. The 
basic idea o f Granger-causality test (whether x  eauses y) is to see how much o f the 
current y  can be explained by past values o f y  and then to see whether adding lagged 
values o f x can improve the explanation. The following equations are regressed:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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h , = a ^ +  ■ (1 -6 )
i=i (=1
The null hypothesis for equation (1.6) is that equity fund flows do not Granger-cause 
security market retums (Hq: 0.21 = 0, for all 1).
m m
A e # , = A + £ A , * , - , + 2 ; A , A e # M + < ,  . (1.7)
1=1 1=1
The null hypothesis for equation (1.7) is that security market retums do not Granger- 
cause equity fund flows (H q: = 0, for all /).
m m m
+Y,(^,idividend,_i
i=l i= l i=
m m
+ ^ a , le a rn in g ,+  Y ,a  5 + s,
11 , i 11
1=1 1=1
The null hypothesis for equation (1.8) is that equity fund flows do not Granger-cause 
security market retums in the presence o f market fundamentals (H q: oĉ , =  0 , for all i).
/n  m  lit
= fio + E  Ai^-i +Tj^2A^fft-i +Y.P2idividendi_i
i= l i^ \
m m
+ Y,P4i^arning,_i +J^P,iTbill,_i +
1 1 1=1 1=1
1=1 1=1
The null hypothesis for equation (1.9) is that security market retums do not Granger- 
cause equity fund flows in the presence of market fundamentals (H q: = 0, for all i).
If equity fund flows contain additional information, they do affect security market 
retums directly. Thus the downward sloping demand curve is supported. If equity fund 
flows do not contain additional information, instead, if  security market retums contain 
additional information about equity fund flows, then horizontal market demand curve is 
implied.
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1.3 DATA
Our data are obtained from National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT). REIT equity fund flows include REIT Initial Public Offering and Secondary 
Equity Offerings (common equity offerings and preferred equity offerings). Figure 1.2 
shows the annual REIT equity offering data. The REIT equity fund flows peaked in 1997 
($32.7 billion), followed by 1998 ($21.5 billion). It slowed down to $2.8 billion in 2000, 
the smallest year, and increased again in 2001 ($6.1 billion). Common stock has the 
largest share o f those offerings. The number o f offering shows the same pattern.
[Insert Figure 1.2 here]
We use NAREIT index to proxy the REIT market portfolio. NAREIT index, 
incepted in January 1972, was designed to provide the most comprehensive assessment o f 
overall industry performance and includes all tax-qualified REITs with common shares 
that trade on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange or the 
NASDAQ National Market List (Grupe and DiRocco 1999). NAREIT index has served 
as investment performance benchmark for the REIT industry. Dividend series and 
eamings series are also provided by NAREIT. 1-month T-bill retum is from Ibbotson and 
Associates, Inc.
The sample period starts in 1993 and ends in 2001, which covers the most rapid 
growth period o f the REIT industry, as we showed in introductory. Monthly data are used 
and we have totally 108 observations.
Figure 1.3 describes the REIT equity fund flows, NAREIT index, and S&P 500 
index in our sample period between January 1993 and December 2001. The REIT equity 
fund flows peak in Octoher 1997 ($5.5 hillion), followed hy Febmary 1998 ($5.1 billion). 
It decreased sharply after April 1998. The NAREIT index and S&P 500 had the same 
pattem in most o f the 1990s. However, the NAREIT index kept an increasing trend when 
the whole stock market suffered a loss in early 2 0 0 0 s.
[Insert Figure 1.3 here]
In the investigation of Granger-causality relationship between REIT equity fund 
flows and REIT market retums, we also use relative equity fund flows, namely 
normalized REIT equity fund flows, to test the robustness o f our results. The normalized
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REIT equity fund flows are ealculated by dividing REIT equity fund flows by the total 
REIT market capitalization in the previous month. This gives us a different view o f the 
REIT equity fund flows trend.
[Insert Figure 1.4 here]
According to Figure 1.4, the normalized REIT equity fund flows decreased 
dramatically after August 1993, where it peaked (9.69%). Specifically, it rarely exceeded 
1% after May 1998. The huge capital inflow into REIT industry is an obvious reason for 
the trend (the denominator grows fast). As we have mentioned earlier, the market 
capitalization in 2001 is nearly five times as large as that of 1993. The early stage o f our 
normalized REIT fimd flows is quite violent. Keep this fmstration in mind, we should 
pay additional attention to the use o f normalized REIT equity fund flows data.
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1.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
1.4.1 Results on the Price-pressure Effect
For the price-pressure effect, we estimate the parameters 6 and 7  m equation (1.3) 
and (1.5) stated in the methodology section. We use the NAREIT index as a proxy for the 
REIT market portfolio price. The results are showed in Table 1.1. In order to estimate the 
parameters 6 and 7 , we calculate the discount parameter p by the inverse o f total return.
That is, p  = —^ , where h, is the sample mean of the REIT market portfolio returns.
\ + h,
We get the discount parameter 0.992 with a sample mean of return 0.855%. We also try 
several other discount parameters in our estimation: 0.95, 0.98, 0.99, and 0.995.
[Insert Table 1.1 here]
As we have discussed before, the significance o f parameters 6 and 7  indicates the 
existence of price-pressure effect. That means the REIT equity fund flow shock affects 
expected cash flow and/or REIT returns beyond what our proxy for expected cash flows 
and REIT returns have covered. On the other hand, the insignificance o f the parameters 6 
and 7  rejects the price-pressure effect. Thus REIT equity fund flow shock impacts the 
expected cash flow and/or REIT returns only through its influence on our proxy for them.
According to Table 1.1 Panel A, the estimations for parameter d are all negative 
and insignificant. The numbers o f the 6 coefficient are quite small, ranging from - 
0.00364 to -0.00360. ^-statistics are only around -0.707, which cannot reject the null 
hypothesis o f an insignificant 0 coefficient. The price-pressure effect is rejected. There is 
little difference o f the estimations when we use different discount parameters.
The results for parameter 7  in Panel B are similar. Estimates for parameter 7  are 
form -0.00341 to -0.00337, with ^-statistics around -0.662. These results reject the price- 
pressure effect, too. The similarity o f the estimations for parameter parameters 6 and 7  
implies that the restriction, the sum of the price-pressure effect and the cash flow effect 
equals to one, influences little on the estimation.
Our results in Table 1.1 indicate that the price-pressure effect for the REIT market 
is very small and insignificant. The rapid growth o f the REIT equity fund flows in 1990s
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did not directly affect the REIT market returns. It may influence the latter through its 
effect on revisions in expected future cash flows and revisions in expected future returns. 
Therefore, our results are consistent with a horizontal market demand curve for REITs. 
This implies that investors cannot influence the market price significantly by solely 
buying or selling the REITs.
1.4.2 Results on the Information Content of REIT Equity Fund Flows
The information content o f REIT equity fund flows is examined by Granger- 
causality test. Before we investigate the causality, we need to find stationary forms o f our 
variables. Table 1.2 provides the unit root test results.
[Insert Table 1.2 here]
According to Table 1.2, all o f the variables in our consideration except REIT 
index retums Qi) are I (1) variables. Thus we use the first-differences o f these variables in 
our regressions: the first difference o f REIT equity fund flows {Aeff), the first difference 
of normalized REIT equity fund flows (AReff), the first difference o f NAREIT indexes 
(ANAREIT), the first difference o f dividends (AD), the first difference o f eamings (AE), 
and the first difference o f 1-month T-bill rates (ATbilF). To test the robustness o f our 
regression, we also adopted other forms of our variables: the growth rate o f dividends 
(GD), the growth rate o f eamings (GE), and the growth rate o f 1-month T-bill rates 
(GTB).
According to Table 1.2, the REIT equity fund flows (also the normalized REIT 
equity fund flows) and the REIT index all are non-stationary variables. Engel and 
Granger (1987) point out that a linear combination o f two or more non-stationary series 
may be stationary. If such a stationary exists, the non-stationary (with a unit root) time 
series are said to be cointegrated. The stationary linear combination is called the 
cointegrating equation and may be interpreted as long-mn equilibrium relationship 
between the variables. Table 1.3 provides the results o f cointegration test between REIT 
equity fund flows and REIT market index.
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
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Using the Johansen cointegration test, the null hypotheses o f none or at most 1 
cointegration is not rejected at the 5% level. The results are the same for both REIT 
equity fund flows and normalized REIT equity fund flows. Therefore, we do not find a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between REIT equity fund flows and REIT market 
index.
Table 1.4 gives the results o f univariate Granger-causality test between REIT 
equity fund flows and REIT market performance. We use both the REIT market index 
retums and the first-difference o f the REIT market indexes as the proxy for REIT market 
performance. Panel A shows that when we concem the additional explanation power of 
REIT equity fund flows to the market retums / index, most o f the null hypotheses are not 
rejected using 1 to 4 lags. However, when we consider the additional explanation power 
of the market retums / index to REIT equity fund flows, all o f the null hypotheses are 
rejected using 1 to 4 lags. The results show that the causality exists from the REIT 
market performance to REIT equity fund flows, not the reverse.
[Insert Table 1.4 here]
However, when we replace the REIT equity fund flows with the normalized REIT 
equity fund flows, nearly all o f the null hypotheses in both directions are not rejected 
(Table 1.4 Panel B). Reminding the data fluctuation on normalized REIT equity fund 
flows in early- to mid- 1990s, it is not a surprise. To get rid o f the violent data 
fluctuation, we focus on the latter part o f the sample period, January 1997 to December 
2001; we get similar results with those reported in Table 1.4 Panel A.
[Insert Table 1.5 here]
According to Table 1.5, when we concem the additional explanation power o f 
normalized REIT equity fund flows to the market retums / index, all o f the null 
hypotheses are not rejected using 1 to 4 lags. However, when we concem the additional 
explanation power o f the market retums / index to normalized REIT equity fund flows, 
most o f the null hypotheses are rejected using 1 to 4 lags.
Results from both Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 indicate that it is the REIT market 
performance Granger-causes the REIT equity fund flows, however, the REIT equity fund 
flows do not Granger-cause REIT Market performance.
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The previous part discussed the relationship between REIT equity fund flows and 
REIT market retums without conceming other variables. Now we reexamine the relation 
with the presence o f the market fundamentals such as eamings, dividends, and interest 
rates.
Table 1.6 Panel A presents the multivariate Granger-causality test from REIT 
equity fund flows to REIT index retums. The null hypothesis o f zero coefficients for the 
first difference o f REIT equity fund flows is not rejected at the 5% level for all 1 to 4 
lags. Thus the results imply that the REIT equity fund flows do not Granger-cause REIT 
index retums. The results are similar when we use the growth rate o f our variables. It 
seems that the REIT equity fund flows do not contain additional information content.
[Insert Table 1.6 here]
On the other hand. Panel B o f Table 1.6 provides different results when we 
consider the reverse direction o f the causality. The null hypothesis, REIT index retums 
do not Granger-cause REIT equity fund flows, is rejected at the 1% level for all cases. 
This implies that the REIT index retums do contain information content other than those 
have been captured by market fundamental variables.
When we examine the normalized REIT equity fund flows, we get similar 
conclusions in Table 1.7. The overall results in Table 1.7 are consistent with those 
reported in univariate tests in Table 1.5. The null hypothesis that normalized REIT equity 
fund flows do not Granger-cause REIT index retums is not rejected at the 5% level, while 
the null hypothesis that REIT index retums do not Granger-cause normalized REIT 
equity fund flows is rejected at the 5% level except for one case. These results confirm 
the implication that the REIT index retums do contain information content other than 
those have been captured by market fundamental variables, while normalized REIT 
equity fund flows do not.
[Insert Table 1.7 here]
Combine the results stated above, we find this relationship holds either in the 
presence o f market fundamentals or not. In sum, REIT equity fund flows do not affect 
REIT market retums directly, if  they affect REIT market performance in other ways. This 
is consistent with Cha and Lee (2001), which examine the common stock market retum 
and equity fund flows. Our results support a horizontal market demand curve for REITs.
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1.4.3 A  V ariance D ecom position for REIT Equity Fund Flows
As we mentioned in the methodology part, the REIT equity fund flows may affect 
REIT market performance indirectly, that is, through revisions in expected cash flows 
(dividends) and in expected future retums based on Campbell and Shiller (1988). 
According to the dividend-price ratio model, the effect on the cash flows (dividends) is 
the numerator effects, while the effect on the discount rate is the denominator effect. 
Table 1.8 provides the results o f the forecast error variance decomposition for REIT 
equity fund flows by using orthogonalized trivariate VAR models.
[Insert Table 1.8 here]
Panel A of Table 1.8 decomposes the variance o f the growth rate o f REIT equity 
fund flows. REIT market retums explain 2-11% of the variance, and the growth rate of 
dividends explains less than 0.4%. The rest o f the forecast error variance for REIT equity 
fund flows, 89-98%, is left for the REIT equity fund flows itself. The results for 
decomposition o f normalized REIT equity fund flows, in Panel B, shows the similar 
results. However, the explanation power o f the REIT market retums lowers to less than 
1.5%. The gap is almost absorbed by the normalized REIT equity fund flows. Overall, the 
REIT market retums do not contribute much o f the variance o f the REIT equity fund 
flows. In both panels, the REIT market retums contribute more for the REIT equity fund 
flows than dividend growth rate does.
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS
Many financial theories eire based on a horizontal security market demand curve. 
However, the studies on this topic are inconclusive. We try to contribute to the market 
demand curve literature by examining securities other than common stocks. We focus on 
a special designed investment instrument: REITs. Given real estate investment is a good 
choice for asset diversification, it is important to investigate the demand curve shape for 
REITs. The tremendous growth o f REIT industry in 1990s provides a perfect case on the 
demand curve study.
We investigate the REIT demand curve slope based on a rapid growth period of 
the industry, from 1993 to 2001. With a methodology that can disentangle the price- 
pressure effect and the information effect, we do not find evidence for the price-pressure 
effect, which states that REIT equity fund flows directly affect REIT market prices. 
Instead, we find that the performance o f REIT market prices does influence REIT equity 
fund flows. The causal relation from REIT market performance to REIT equity fund 
flows does exist with or without the presence o f market fundamentals such as eamings 
and dividends. However, we do not find the causal relation from REIT equity fund flows 
to the REIT market performance. In sum, our findings support the horizontal market 
demand curve for REITs.
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ESSAY 2. TIME VARYING RISK PREMIUM FOR EQUITY REITS: 
EVIDENCE FROM DAILY DATA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
REITs are usually categorized into three types: equity REITs, mortgage REITs, 
and hybrid REITs. These three types of REITs have different growth paths in the past few 
decades. Figure 2.1 provides the overview of the REIT industry by different types since 
1971.
[Insert Figure 2.1 here]
The overall REIT equity market capitalization shown in Figure 2.1 had increased 
tremendously since 1971. The most significant growth occurred after 1992 with an 
annual compounded growth rate o f 21.7%.
Equity REITs contribute to most o f the total growth. They have dominated the 
REIT industry since late 1980s. Equity REITs counted for 54% o f capitalization and 48% 
o f REIT numbers in 1988. At the same time, the capitalization share o f mortgage REITs 
and hybrid REITs were 32% and 15%, respectively. Equity REITs kept growing in 
1990s. By the year-end of 2001, they had capitalization share o f 95% and number share 
of 83%. The annual compounded growth rate o f equity REIT capitalization is 24.1% 
($26.1 billion in 1993 to $147.1 billion in 2001), which is higher than the overall REIT 
growth rate.
Such rapid growth o f equity REITs in recent years provokes our interest in 
investigating the retum generating process, more specifically, the time-varying risk 
premium of equity REITs. In this essay, we adopt Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditionally Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model to examine the changing variances in 
excess equity REIT retums.
Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model introduced by 
Engle (1982) is a prominent tool in investigating time changing variances o f security 
prices. Bollerslev (1986) generalizes it to GARCH model. Engle, Lilien, and Robins
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(1987) further extend the model to ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model, where the 
conditional mean is an explicit function of the conditional variance o f the process. Since 
the ARCH-M model can deal with the trade-off between risk and expected retum in 
finance research, it triggered the boom of literature on time-vaiying conditional variance. 
The ARCH and GARCH models have been applied broadly to stock retum data (Engle 
and Mustafa 1992), interest rate data (Engle, Lilien, and Robins 1987), and foreign 
exchange rate data (Hsieh 1989). However, the application on REIT data has been rare. 
To our knowledge, there is only one article on this topic by Devaney (2001) with monthly 
REIT data from 1978 to 1998.
Our paper differs from Devaney’s article in the following aspects. First, we use 
daily REIT data instead o f monthly data. We believe volatility clustering may have 
different characteristics for different frequency data sets. Daily data may be more suited 
for investigating autoregressive conditionally heteroscedasticity due to a higher 
frequency data. Second, we only cover the period during the dramatic growth o f equity 
REITs. As we mentioned above, the REIT industry expanded quickly after 1992. 
Devaney (2001) traces data back to 1978, when equity REITs only had a capitalization of 
$0.58 billion (0.39% of the equity REIT capitalization in 2001). The larger the REIT 
industry, the more active is the security trading. Thus this study o f volatility may be more 
meaningful. However, the data before June 1995 is not available. Our sample period is 
between June 1995 and September 2002. Finally, we introduce the market portfolio, 
S&P 500 index, in the mean equation, which allows us to consider the influence o f the 
total market retums.
Our results indicate that both ARCH and GARCH effects in the volatility 
equation is significant for equity REITs. Our results are in conflict with Devaney’s 
finding. He reports that ARCH term is not significant for equity REITs. Our results also 
indicate that the change in interest rates impacts REIT excess retums; however, this effect 
seems to be shadowed by the market portfolio. Data and methodology are presented in 
the next section. Then empirical results are discussed in section three. The conclusion 
section summarizes the findings.
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2.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data we utilize for this essay is the daily Morgan Stanley REIT Index, which 
is a market capitalization weighted index comprised o f most actively traded REITs. As of 
November 30, 2000, the index included 116 equity REITs (excluding health care REITs) 
and had an equity market capitalization of $119.6 billion (Acton and Rothman 2001). Its 
composition included residential sector (23%), office/industrial sector (47%), retail sector 
(21%), and other sectors (19%). The index was developed with a base value o f 200.00 as 
o f December 31, 1994. Figure 2.2 graphs equity REIT index compared with S&P 500 
index. The correlation between these two indices in our sample period is 0.467.
[Insert Figure 2.2 here]
The Morgan Stanley changes the constituent list each quarter. Therefore, the 
survival bias is controlled to an immaterial level. Daily data o f the Morgan Stanley REIT 
Index is available from June 13, 1995. Our sample period covers data from the inception 
to September 30, 2002. Although other REIT indices have longer monthly data period 
(i.e., NAREIT indices), this is the longest available daily data for REITs.
The daily percentage retum on the index is calculated by the following 
continuously compounding method; r, = \n[IndeXf / *100. The raw retums and
excess retums are graphed in Figure 2.3. The excess retums are measured as the retums 
of REIT Index minus daily three-month Treasury bill rates. Summary statistics are 
provided in Table 2.1.
[Insert Figure 2.3 here]
The mean daily excess retum is 0.0044 percent for the equity REIT index, which 
is equivalent to an annual excess retum of 1.62 percent. Small negative skewness and 
leptokurtic are observed from the table. According to the Jarque-Bera test, under the null 
hypothesis o f a normal distribution, the statistic is distributed as ;);^with 2 degrees of 
freedom. We rejected the null hypothesis at the 1% level. The rejection o f normality 
implies that ARCH and GARCH models is appropriate to the equity REIT data.
[Insert Table 2.1 here]
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The linear ARCH {q) model suggested by Engle (1982) can be written as 
expressing as a linear function o f past squared values of the process:
y , = x \ X  + £ ,  (2 .1)
g ] = o) + =Q) + a (L)£f , (2.2)
i=\
The mean equation given in (2.1) is written as a function o f exogenous variables 
with an error term. In the variance equation (2.2), co > 0 and «, > 0 , and L denotes the
lag operator. Since cr/ is the one-period ahead forecast variance based on past
information, it is called the conditional variance. According to financial data, this linear 
ARCH (q) model captures the tendency for volatility clustering, i.e., for large (small) 
price changes to be followed by large (small) price changes with unpredicted sign.
The GARCH (p, q) model provided by Bollerslev (1986) adds the lag variables of 
a f  into the variance equation:
o-f = ^  + S  + Z  ® + a ( ^ ) ^ '  + . (2.3)
(=1 1=1
Thus the conditional variance equation specified is a function o f three terms: 1) 
the mean 03, 2) news about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lags of 
the squared residual from the mean equation: (T )ff — the ARCH term, and 3) previous
periods’ forecast variances: {L)g^— the GARCH term. Notice that all the parameters in 
the infinite-order AR representation g ^ =(j){L)£^ = { \-P {L )y^a {L )£ ^  must be 
nonnegative. For a GARCH (1, 1) model this means that both and are 
nonnegative. If  and only if  a (I) + P{\) < I , £̂  is covariance stationary. That is, the
GARCH (p, q) model corresponds to an infinite-order linear ARCH model with 
geometrically declining parameters. The order o f p  and q can be identified by rearranging 
terms in the GARCH (p, q) model as an ARMA model for £^ with AR parameters 
a{L) + P {L), MA parameters -J3 (L ), and serial uncorrelated innovation sequence 
{£f - G f } .  However, normally p  = q = \ is found to suffice (Bollerslev, Chou, and
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Kroner 1992). Thus we adopt GARCH (1, 1) model for the variance equation in our 
paper.
A GARCH-in-Mean (GARCH-M) model introduces the conditional variance, 
a f , into the mean equation:
yt — + ^( 5 (2-4)
thus the estimated coefficient on the expected risk is a measure o f the risk-retum tradeoff.
While constructing our mean equation, we consider the first lag o f the dependent 
variable (excess retum), the excess retum of market portfolio, and the interest rates. 
Several papers have examined the relationship between REIT retums and interest rates. 
For example, Chen and Tzang (1988) find that both equity REITs and mortgage REITs 
respond to the movement o f interest rates. Similar results are reported by Devaney 
(2001). However, Mueller and Pauley (1995) argue that interest rate is not an important 
factor to explain REIT price changes. Our paper tries to reexamine the conflicting issue 
by including ten-year Treasury yield to our estimations. We also include the market 
portfolio in our mean equation to test the sensitivity o f equity REIT retums to the whole 
market. S&P 500 index is used as the proxy for the market portfolio.
[Insert Table 2.2 here]
In order to get appropriate forms o f our variables, we implement unit root test. 
The results are reported in Table 2.2. We find that both the excess retum of equity REIT 
index and the excess retum of S&P 500 index are I (0) variables, however, the ten-year 
Treasury yield is 1 (1) variable. Thus we use the first difference o f ten-year Treasury yield 
in our mean equation. We employ several versions o f our mean equation:
r ,= a ,+ a ,r^ ^ + e ,  (2.5)
r, = + £■, (2 .6 )
r ,= a ^ +  a.r^p + + e, (2.7)
where r, is the daily excess retum of the equity REIT index, represents the daily
excess retum of the S&P 500 index, Ai represents first-difference o f daily ten-year 
Treasury yield, is a constant term, and is an error term.
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We also examine adding GARCH-M terms, standard error or varianee, into the 
mean equation:
=«o +cci^^p +cc,cT,+s, (2.5-1)
= a ^ + (2.6-1)
r, = + s. (2.7-1)
(2.5-2)
r, = «o + (2.6-2)
r, = «(, + + a^a]  + £■, (2.7-2)
The variance equation is:
<yf — /?Q + + ^ 2 ^ t-\ • (2.8)
Table 2.3 reports the correlation matrix o f the variables in the mean equation. The
highest correlation coefficient is between excess retums of equity REITs and excess 
retums o f the market portfolio, 0.461. The movement o f 10-year treasury interest rates is 
marginally correlated with other two variables, 0.044 with excess retums o f equity REITs 
and 0.076 with excess retums o f market portfolio.
[Insert Table 2.3 here]
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2.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results are reported in Table 2.4. The os represent the coefficients 
o f the variables in the mean equation, while the /3s represent the coefficients o f the 
variables in the variance model.
[Insert Table 2.4 here]
The null hypothesis o f = 0 implies that the excess retums o f market portfolio 
do not have an impact on the equity REIT excess retums. This hypothesis is rejected at 
the 1% level in both group (2.5) and group (2.7) estimations. The positive coefficients 
show that the excess retums o f the equity REITs and the market portfolio excess retums 
move in the same direction.
The null hypothesis o f a 2 = 0  indicates that the changes in interest rates are not a 
significant factor in determining equity REIT excess retums. This hypothesis is rejected 
at the 1% level in the group (2.6) estimations, which is consistent with Devaney (2001); 
however, it is not rejected at the group (2.7) equations. The signs o f the coefficients are 
negative in both estimation groups. That is, when we consider the movement o f the 
interest rates and the first lag o f the dependent variable only, the changes in interest rates 
do have an impact on the equity REIT excess retums. But when we include the market 
portfolio excess retums, the impact seems to be shadowed by the market portfolio. 
Noticing the low correlation coefficient between the first difference o f interest rates and 
stock market excess retums, 0.076, we believe that the excess retums o f the market 
portfolio may reflect the movements o f the interest rates. The Adjusted R-Square also 
provides information on the explanatory power o f different independent variables. 
Comparing estimation group (2.6) and (2.7), we notice that adding the market retums 
increases the Adjusted R-Square from 7% to 28.5%, where the difference is equivalent to 
the explanation power o f the market retums in estimation group (2.5). That is, the 
explanatory power o f the interest rate movements is marginal. In fact, we get close to 
zero Adjusted R-Square when we let the interest rate movements be the only independent 
variable in the mean equation, even though the coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
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According to Table 2.4, the null hypothesis o f « 3  = 0 is rejected at the 1% level 
in both group (2.6) and group (2.7) estimations. That indicates the first autocorrelation of 
the dependent variable influences the current retums, i.e., the large (small) daily excess 
retums o f equity REIT is likely to be followed by a large (small) daily excess retums.
« 4  and « 5  represent the coefficients o f the GARCH-M terms. None of these 
terms is significant in our estimations. Our results reject the null hypotheses that the 
expected retums on equity REITs is related to the expected REIT risk. In Devaney
(2001), the first difference o f conditional variance of the interest rates is used instead of 
the conditional variance o f the REIT retums. However, we do not get significant results 
even when we include the conditional variance o f interest rates.
The constant term o f the mean equations, a ^, is significant at the 5% or 10% 
level for the GARCH (1 ,1 )  estimations but not for the GARCH (1, 1)-M estimations. 
This indicates other unmentioned variables could be investigated to explain the mean. 
Equation (2.5) is a time-varying version of the capital asset prieing model (CAPM) 
introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In the context o f the CAPM, equity 
REITs have produced an average abnormal retum of 1.5% on annual basis for the study 
period.
The results for the variance estimations are quite consistent for all versions o f our 
models. The constant terms, the ARCH terms, and the GARCH terms all are positively 
significant at the 1% level. This is in contrast to Devaney (2001), who shows that the null 
hypothesis o f no ARCH effects cannot be rejected even at the 10% level for equity 
REITs. In his paper, the null hypothesis o f zero eonstant term cannot be rejeeted for 
equity REITs, either. Such conflicts may be due to the different data frequency and 
sample period.
The sum of the coefficients o f ARCH and GARCH terms can be interpreted as the 
measure o f volatility consistence. In our case, i/3^+ P 2 ) ranges from 0.974 to 0.982, 
which is very close to 1. It indicates that the volatility shocks in equity REIT excess 
retums are quite persistent.
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS
The REIT industry, especially equity REITs, has grown very fast in the last 
decade. However, studies on the risk premium of equity REITs have been rare. Using a 
daily data set from June 1995 to September 2002, we examine the time varying risk 
premium for equity REITs by adopting GARCH and GARCH-M methodologies.
The results show that both the ARCH and GARCH effects are significant for our 
estimations. In addition, the sum of the coefficients o f ARCH and GARCH terms is very 
close to 1, which indicates that the volatility shocks are quite persistent. The market 
retums and the first order autocorrelation help explain the excess retum o f equity REITs. 
However, the contribution o f interest rate movements seems to be shadowed by the 
market retums. In our results, we did not find evidence that the GARCH-M terms are 
relevant in determining the expected retums. In addition, we find that equity REITs have 
outperformed the S&P 500 index with an average abnormal annual retum o f 1.5% during 
this period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
ESSAY 3. REIT RISK PREMIUM: THE EFFECTS OF INVESTOR  
SENTIMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth o f the REIT industry, especially that occurred after 1992, has 
provoked public interest in studying the REIT risk premium. Defined as the difference 
between the retum on securities and the retum on a risk-free asset, the equity risk 
premium has been studied for a long time. There are two main streams o f research on this 
subject. One focuses on the size o f the equity risk premium, the other tries to determine 
the variables that can explain the equity premium.
Since stocks are risky in general, we expect them to have retums higher than the 
risk-free rate. But how large is the retum gap reasonable? Using a standard general 
equilibrium model in which individuals have additively separable utility functions and 
constant relative risk aversion, Mehra and Prescott (1985) were the first to argue that the 
6% equity premium reported in most studies is too high. This led to the equity risk 
premium puzzle.
Some authors have found empirical evidence supporting a low equity premium. 
Using a longer time period (1802-1990), Siegel (1992) finds that the real retum on equity 
held remarkably constant over the sample period, while the real retum on fixed income 
assets declined dramatically. Given the underestimation o f the expected real retum on 
risk-free asset and an overestimation o f the realized retum on equities, Siegel (1999) 
concludes that the equity premium is about 1% to 2% per year. Jagannathan, McGrattan 
and Scherbina (2000) also report that the U.S. equity premium has declined significantly 
during the last three decades. However, other empirical results show that the equity 
premium is really high. For example, Fama and French (2002) point out that the average 
stock retums o f the last half-century is a lot higher than expected. Thus the answer o f the 
equity premium puzzle is still inconclusive.
Many studies have searched for variables that can explain the equity premium. 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) proposed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)
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is by far the most widely accepted approach to explain the equity premium. In this model, 
the market beta suffices to describe the cross-sectional variations o f expected equity 
premium. However, many researchers have questioned the reliability o f CAPM, since it 
cannot explain certain patterns o f observed equity premium. For example, Banz (1981) 
finds that the common stocks o f small firms had higher risk-adjusted retums than the 
common stocks o f large firms during 1936-1975. This ‘size effect’ was seen as evidence 
o f the CAPM misspecification. Fama and French (1992) find that equity book-to-market 
value and firm size appear to capture the majority o f cross-sectional variations in average 
stock retums. They also find no relation between market beta and average retum when 
control for size. In their related paper, Fama and French (1996) standardize firm size and 
book-to-market factor to a three-factor model. These three factors are: market premium, 
the difference between the retum on a portfolio o f small stocks and the retum on a 
portfolio o f large stocks (SMB, small minus big), and the difference between the retum 
on a portfolio o f high book-to-market ratio stocks and the retum on a portfolio o f low 
book-to-market ratio stocks (HML, high minus low). Their results show that the 
anomalies unexplained by the CAPM largely disappear in this three-faetor model, except 
for the continuation o f short-term retums.
To account for the short-term continuation of stock retums, Carhart (1997) 
proposes the fourth factor: momentum factor, which is the average retum on the two 
high-prior-retum portfolios minus the average retum on the two low-prior-retum 
portfolios. This factor accounts for the Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) momentum 
anomaly.
A closely related approach is the research on the impacts o f economic variables 
on equity premium. Instead o f focusing on stock characteristics, this approach examines 
variables in the economic environment. For example, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) 
examine several macroeconomic variables such as the spread between long and short 
interest rates, expected and unexpected inflation, industrial production, and the spread 
between high- and low-grade bonds. They find these economic factors are significantly 
priced in the stock market.
On the risk premium of REITs, researches have been done with approaches 
similar to those on the general equity risk premium. Peterson and Hsieh (1997), for
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example, examine the relation between REIT risk premium and the eommon risk factors 
in the retums on stocks (e.g., market premium, SMB, HML) and bonds (e.g., term spread, 
default spread). Their results show that the common factors affecting stock and bond 
retums are also significantly related to REIT excess retums. Swanson, Theis, Casey and
(2002) investigate the relation between daily REIT stock risk premium and interest rates. 
Their results indicate that REIT retums are more sensitive to maturity rate spread 
between short- and long-term treasuries than the credit rate spread between commercial 
bonds and treasuries.
In this essay, we examine REIT risk premium from a new perspective, 
speeifieally, the effects o f investor sentiment and institutional ownership.
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) argue that investor sentiment 
(the unpredictability o f the opinions o f not-fully-rational investors) impounds resale price 
risk on the assets they trade. Based on clientele theory, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) 
use closed-end fund discounts as a proxy for individual investor sentiment. They propose 
that fluctuations in discounts o f closed-end funds are driven by changes in individual 
investor sentiment. The rationale is that individual investors are more likely to hold and 
trade closed-end funds than the underlying assets in the funds’ portfolio. A number of 
studies have found investor sentiment significantly related to asset retums (e.g., 
Swaminathan 1996, Neal and Wheatley 1998). In this study, we examine whether the 
investor sentiment is priced in the REIT market.
On the other hand, the REIT equity premium could also be affected by the 
behavior o f rational investors. It has been found in the literature that institutional trading 
has a positive effect on stock retums (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1992). 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) also document a strong positive correlation between changes 
in institutional ownership and retums measured over the same period. Dennis and 
Strickland (2002) argue that a firm’s abnormal retum on higher retum days (absolute 
value o f the market’s retum is two percent or more) is related to the percentage of 
institutional ownership. In this study, we examine REIT equity premium and REIT 
institutional ownership to see whether they are positively related.
For controlling purpose, we adopt two sets o f control variables in our analysis. 
One set includes two interest rate variables from the economic factors approach, namely
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term spread, which is the difference between long-term and short-term treasury rates, and 
default spread, which is the difference between high-ranking corporate bond rate and 
mid-ranking corporate bond rate. The other set includes the Fama-French three factors 
from the stock characteristics approach, namely excess retum on the market, SMB, and 
HML.
We add to the literature in the following aspects. First o f all, we are the first to 
investigate the relation between REIT risk premium and investor sentiment. Could 
investor sentiment explain the REIT risk premium? Previous research has found investor 
sentiment priced in stock retums, but no such studies have been done on REITs. We 
believe REITs represent an appropriate target for the investigation because REITs 
themselves are closed-end funds. According to Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), investor 
sentiment is prevalent among closed-end funds. Specifically, this paper tries to provide 
evidence on the effects o f investor sentiment (proxy by changes in domestic equity 
closed-end fund discounts) on REIT risk premium. Secondly, our paper also adds to the 
literature by directly examining the relation between REIT risk premium and REIT 
institutional ownership. We want to know if  the change of institutional ownership drives 
the REIT retums. We also want to know how the rational (institutional) and irrational 
(individual) investors jointly affect the REIT premium. In addition, we not only examine 
the relation between REIT risk premium and investor sentiment/institutional ownership 
simultaneously but also investigate their causalities. Finally, we test for the independence 
o f information contained in investor sentiment and institutional ownership by including 
other control variables in our analysis. If the investor sentiment and institutional 
ownership help in explaining REIT risk premium in the presence o f other widely 
accepted forecasting variables, we could conclude that the information contained in 
investor sentiment and institutional ownership is independent.
Our findings show that REIT risk premium is negatively related to investor 
sentiment. That is, when investors are optimistic, the REIT risk premium tends to be 
higher. When investors are pessimistic, REIT risk premium declines. The results are 
robust no matter we include the control variables or not. That is, the effects o f investor 
sentiment on REIT risk premium are independent o f those o f other forecasting variables. 
However, we do not find significant relation between REIT risk premium and
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institutional ownership changes except for small-size REITs. For small-size REITs, the 
risk premium is positively related to the change o f institutional ownership. When 
institutional investors increase (decrease) their small-size REIT shareholdings, the small- 
size REIT risk premium tends to be higher (lower). This effect is also significant in the 
presence o f other control variables. Furthermore, we find evidence that the information 
contained in past investor sentiment changes does affect REIT risk premium. The 
information contained in past institutional ownership changes, however, only affects 
REIT risk premium in the first sub-period between 1994 and 1998, and for the good 
performing REITs.
The essay is organized as follows. The next section proposes our hypotheses. 
Then data and methodology are described. Empirical results are discussed in section five. 
The last section summarizes the paper.
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3.2 HYPOTHESES
As we have mentioned above, closed-end fund discounts reflect the unpredictable 
investor sentiment that causes noise in stock markets. When investor sentiment is 
optimistic, closed-end fund discounts will tend to shrink. This optimistic sentiment 
affects asset retums positively. Contrarily, when investor sentiment is pessimistic, closed- 
end fund discounts will tend to enlarge. This pessimistic sentiment affects asset retums 
negatively. Thus we hypothesize that the REIT risk premium will move in the opposite 
direction with the change of closed-end fund discounts.
Hypothesis 1: REIT risk premium will be negatively related to the change o f 
closed-end fund discounts.
The REIT equity premium could also be affected by the behavior o f institutional 
investors. Since institutional investors are more informed than individual investors, they 
are likely to buy undervalued stocks and sell overvalued stocks. On the other hand, the 
buying and selling o f institutional investors may have an effect on REIT retums. We 
expect a positive relation between REIT risk premium and the changes o f institutional 
ownership. Previous studies have found evidence that institutional trading has a positive 
effect on stock retums. For example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) report a strong positive 
correlation between changes in institutional ownership and retums measured during the 
same period. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) also find a positive correlation 
between changes in institutional holdings and contemporaneously excess retums for 
small stocks. We propose that the REIT risk premium will move in the same direction as 
the change o f REIT institutional ownership.
Hypothesis 2: REIT risk premium will be positively related to the change of REIT 
institutional ownership.
It is necessary to point out that the hypotheses merely propose the correlation 
between the REIT risk premium with closed-end fund discounts and REIT institutional 
ownership. The hypotheses do not state the causality between REIT risk premium and the 
variables. The causality relationship will be discussed later in the paper.
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3.3 DATA
The daily return data o f REITs are obtained from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) for the sample period from October 1994 to December 2001. At 
the end o f each year from 1993 to 2000, we screen all the securities in CRSP by SIC code 
to obtain our sample o f REIT firms. We eliminate those REITs without all 12 months 
retums or institutional ownership data in each sample year. An equal-weighted REIT 
portfolio is constracted with annual rebalancing. All daily retums are converted to 
monthly continuously compounded excess retums. The monthly risk premium is defined 
as monthly excess retum, which is the difference between the monthly REIT portfolio 
retum and the monthly one-month T-bill retum. The one-month T-bill retum is obtained 
from Ibbotson Associates.
Closed-end Fund discounts are hand collected from the Standard and Poor’s 
Security Owner’s Stock Guide. Each month we collect the discount (premium) data for all 
domestic equity elosed-end funds. After eliminating those closed-end funds with missing 
discount data in each sample year, an equal-weighted discount series is constmcted for 
the later regression analysis. The change in closed-end fund discounts is defined as the 
difference between two consecutive discounts. Since the Standard and Poor’s Security 
Owner’s Stock Guide initiated the closed-end fund summary data in October 1994, our 
sample period starts from that time.
The REIT institutional ownership data is also obtained from Standard and Poor’s 
Security Owner’s Stock Guide. For each REIT, the monthly institutional ownership is 
equal to the shares held by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding during the 
month. An equal-weighted REIT institutional ownership series is constmcted for the later 
regression analysis. The REITs included in our retum portfolio and the REITs included in 
our institutional ownership portfolio are the same for each individual year.
Table 3.1 describes the screening process o f the sample size o f REITs and closed- 
end funds. Our final sample o f REITs ranges from a minimum of 70 in 1994 to a 
maximum of 156 in 1999, for a total o f 919 firm-years. The number o f closed-end funds 
is from a minimum of 33 in 1995 to a maximum of 42 in 1999, for a total o f 296 fund- 
years.
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[Insert Table 3.1 Here]
Descriptive statistics for the REIT sample and domestic equity closed-end fund 
discounts data are shown in Table 3.2. The average REIT capitalization is $674 million, 
while the median REIT capitalization is $344 million. The wide range o f REIT 
capitalizations, from $1 million to $12 billion, suggests we should pay attention to the 
possibility o f a size effect on REIT performance.
The average REIT institutional ownership is 39%, it is lower than the average of 
51% for US corporations in general. The institutional ownership is as high as 91% or as 
low as near 0%. For the closed-end fund discounts, the average discount is 10% with a 
median 11%. The maximum discount is 42%, while the minimum discount is -38%, or 
38% premium.
[Insert Table 3.2 Here]
Figure 3.1 presents the monthly movements o f the three major variables in the 
whole sample period from October 1994 to December 2001: REIT portfolio retums, 
REIT portfolio institutional ownership, and closed-end fund portfolio discounts.
[Insert Figure 3.1 Here]
The monthly REIT portfolio retums vary between the range of -10.1%  and 9.2% 
with the highest retum in January 2001 and the lowest retum in August 1998. The 
monthly domestic equity closed-end fund portfolio discounts fluctuate from the deepest 
discount o f 23.8% in August 1998 to the largest premium of 1.8% in November 2001. It 
is interesting that the REIT retums and the closed-end fund discounts are basically 
moving in the opposite directions. Also the lowest retum and the highest discount occur 
simultaneously in August 1998. For the monthly REIT portfolio institutional ownership 
series, the data range is from the highest ownership 45.0% in March 1998 to the lowest 
ownership 33.4% in January 1997. According to Figure 3.1, REIT retums and changes in 
institutional ownership appear uncorrelated.




Both univariate and multivariate regressions are used in this paper. First o f all, we 
examine the univariate relation between REIT risk premium and changes in closed-end 
fund discounts and REIT institutional ownership respectively:
R, = a  + p  M )IS ,+ s , , (3.1)
R, = a  +  Y  AIO, + £,, (3.2)
where ADISt is the change in closed-end fund discounts, and AlOt is the change in REIT 
institutional ownership.
Secondly, control variables are added to the univariate regressions. The purpose 
o f adding control variables is to see whether the information contained in the change o f 
closed-end fund discounts and the change in REIT institutional ownership is independent 
o f that o f the control variables. The control variables are a set o f interest rate variables: 
default spread and term spread. Swanson, Theis, Casey and (2002) had found these 
interest rates significantly related to REIT risk premium.
R , ^ a  + p  ADIS, + 9 DBF, + 1  TERM, + s , , (3.3)
R , ^ a  + y AIO, + 9 DBF, + A TERM, + s , , (3.4)
where the default spread DEFt, a measure o f the default risk premium, is defined as the 
difference between the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield and the Moody’s 
Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield. The term spread TERMt, a measure o f term risk 
premium, is defined as the difference between 30-year Treasury bond rate and one-month 
T-bill rate. The interest rate data is obtained from Federal Reserve Bank. Equation (3.3) 
and (3.4) examine the relation between REIT risk premium and change in closed-end 
fund discounts, and the relation between REIT risk premium and change in REIT 
institutional ownership in the presence o f default risk premium and term spread premium.
We then investigate the REIT risk premium by considering the rational 
investment {10) and investor sentiment {DIS) simultaneously:
R , = a  + p  ADIS, + r  A/0, + s, , (3.5)
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R, = a  + J3 A D IS ,+ r MO, +6 DEF, + ^  TERM, +s , .  (3.6)
We also consider another set o f control variables, the Fama-French three factors, 
in our regression;
R, -  a  + /3 ADIS, + y AID, + tj Rm, + // SMB, + pHML, + e , , (3.7)
where R m , the excess retum on the market, is the value-weighted retum on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
SMB is the average retum on three small portfolios minus the average retum on three big 
portfolios. HML is the average retum on two value portfolios minus the average retum on 
two growth portfolios (Fama and French 1993, 1996). SMB and HML capture the size 
effect and book-to-market value effect, respectively. These factors are constmcted using 
six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and book-to-market.
Finally, we include both sets o f control variables in our regression:
R ,= a  + !3 ADIS, +y AID, +eDEF,+X TERM, + r |R ^ + p  SMB, + pRMI^ +s, (3.8)
In equations (3.1) - (3.8), we hypothesize the coefficients o f change in closed-end 
fimd discoxmts, p, will be negative, and the coefficients of change in REIT institutional 
ownership, y, will be positive.
3.4.2 Granger-causality Test
It is well known that the correlation between two variables does not necessarily 
imply a causal relationship. We examine the relation between REIT equity premium and 
the change o f investor sentiment / institutional ownership by adopting the Granger- 
causality test. The basic idea o f Granger-causality test (whether x  causes y) is to see how 
much of the current y can be explained by past values o fy  and then to see whether adding 
lagged values o f x  can improve the explanation.
We can interpret Granger-causality as the additional information content of 
variable x  that can affect variable y  directly. Or whether the past information contained in 
variable y  could affect variable x. Both univariate and multivariate Granger-causality tests 
are employed in our analysis. The following equations are regressed:
m m
= « 0  + + Y ^ 2iMMS,_i + s , . (3.9)
•̂=1 /=!
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
The null hypothesis for equation (3.9) is that change in closed-end fund discounts does 
not Granger-cause REIT risk premium (Hq: Ci2 i = 0 , for all i).
m m m m
^ , = ^ 0 +  Y ĉCuRt-j +  +  s , . (3 .1 0 )
(=1 i= l  i - l  i= l
The null hypothesis for equation (3 .1 0 )  is that change in closed-end fund discounts does 
not Granger-cause REIT risk premium in the presence o f default spread and term spread 
(Hq: 0 2 / = 0 , for all i).
m m m m m
R,=(^o+ +s, (3.11)
/=1 1=1 i=l i= l /=1
The null hypothesis for equation (3.11) is that change in closed-end fund discounts does 
not Granger-cause REIT risk premium in the presence o f Fama-French three factors (H q: 
a2i = 0, for all i).
Similarly, the process is used to examine the relationship between REIT risk 
premium and change in REIT institutional ownership.
m m
Rt = « o  +Y^uR,-i  +  +  s , . (3 .1 2 )
(=1 1=1
The null hypothesis for equation (3.12) is that change in REIT institutional ownership 
does not Granger-cause REIT risk premium (Hq: = 0 , for all /).
m m m m
R,=<Xq + Y  ̂ liRt-j + Z  + z  + Z  cc^iTERM,_i +e, .  (3.13)
1=1 1=1 i= i  (=1
The null hypothesis for equation (3.13) is that change in REIT institutional ownership 
does not Granger-cause REIT risk premium in the presence of default spread and term 
spread (Hq: 0 2 , =  0 , for all i).
m m m m m
R, =a, +Yo^,,Rm,-i +Z«4,*̂ 4̂-, +Z«5,™f-, (3-14)
/=1 /= ! /=1 z=l i= l
The null hypothesis for equation (3.14) is that change in REIT institutional ownership 
does not Granger-cause REIT risk premium in the presence o f Fama-French three factors 
(H q: a.2i = 0 , for all i).
If the changes in closed-end fund discounts and REIT institutional ownership 
Granger-cause REIT risk premium, they do affect REIT risk premium directly.
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3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The descriptive statistics for the series in our regression analysis are shown in 
Table 3.3. The average monthly REIT excess return is 0.954%, the data ranges from -  
10.565% to 8.683% with a standard deviation 3.282%. The monthly change in portfolio 
institutional ownership has an average 0.039%. The mean monthly change in closed-end 
fund discounts is -0.095%, which is a decrease o f discounts. For the interest rates, the 
average monthly data for default spread and term spread are 0.715% and 5.784%, 
respectively. The means for market excess return, SMB, and HML are 0.792%, -0.014%, 
and 0.326%, respectively.
[Insert Table 3.3 Here]
In Table 3.4, the correlation between monthly REIT excess retimi and the change 
in closed-end fund discounts is -0.385, which has the consistent sign with our Hypothesis 
1. However, the correlation between monthly REIT excess return and the change of 
institutional ownership has a negative sign, which is opposite to our Hypothesis 2. This 
correlation is also very low, only -0.025. All the five control variables are positively 
correlated with the REIT excess return. The correlation between the change o f closed-end 
fund discounts and the change in REIT institutional ownership is -0.139.
[Insert Table 3.4 Here]
3.5.1 Regression Results
The regression results for equation (3.1) to (3.8) for the whole sample period 
(October 1994 to December 2001) are reported in Table 3.5. The coefficients o f the 
change o f closed-end fund discounts are negative and significant at the 1% level 
whenever it is included. This supports our first hypothesis that REIT risk premium is 
negatively related to the change o f closed-end fund discounts. The results show that 
higher REIT returns are related to a decline in closed-end fund discounts, or more 
optimistic investor sentiment. Our finding is consistent with the results o f Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler (1991), which show that stock returns are negatively correlated with changes 
in closed-end fund discounts. Furthermore, in multivariate regression equations (3.3), 
(3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), the significance of the change in closed-end fund discounts
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implies that the change in closed-end fund discounts does contain information in addition 
to interest rates and the three common factors identified by Fama and French.
[Insert Table 3.5 Here]
According to Table 3.5, it is also shown that the change in REIT institutional 
ownership has negative and insignificant coefficients with very low t-values. Thus our 
second hypothesis that REIT risk premium is positively related to the change o f REIT 
institutional ownership is not supported. The result is inconsistent with Nofsinger and 
Sias (1999) that document a strong positive correlation between changes in institutional 
ownership and contemporaneous returns.
The coefficients for default spread and term spread are positive but insignificant. 
It is different from the results o f Swanson, Theis, and Casey (2002). They find that 
interest rates have a significant effect on REIT returns. However, the Fama-French three 
factors are all positive and significant at the 1% level. This confirms the results of 
Peterson and Hsieh (1997), which show the monthly returns on REITs are significantly 
related to market portfolio risk premium, size factor, and book-to market factor.
The constant term is insignificant whenever we include our control variables, 
either interest rates or Fama-French three factors. Otherwise, it is positive and significant 
at the 1% level. This implies that variables other than changes in elosed-end fund 
discounts and REIT institutional ownership do contribute to REIT excess returns.
Regarding the explanatory power o f the various regression models, we find the 
models with the change in closed-end fund discounts have a higher Adjusted R-Square 
than those without. It is interesting that equation (3.7) and (3.8), which include the Fama- 
French three factors as the control variables, have the highest Adjusted R-Squares. It 
suggests that stock characteristics such as the Fama-French three factors explain REIT 
risk premium better than economic factors such as interest rates.
We also run the regressions based on two equal-length sub-periods. The results 
are reported in Table 3.6. In the first sub-period, from October 1994 to May 1998, the 
coefficients o f the change in closed-end fund discounts are negative and significant at the 
10% level in equation (3.1), (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8). The coefficients o f the 
Fama-French three factors are positive and significant at the 1% level. None o f the 
coefficients o f the change in REIT institutional ownership and interest rates is significant
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except in equation (3.8), where the default spread is significant at the 10% level. In 
general the results have the same pattern as those in the whole sample period. The 
Adjusted R-Squares are lower in most regressions than those in the whole sample period.
[Insert Table 3.6 Here]
In the second sub-period, most o f the regressions have stronger explanation power 
than those in the whole sample period. The coefficients o f the change in closed-end fund 
discounts are now negative and significant at the 1% or 5% level. The Fama-French three 
factors are still significant at the 1% level, while other independent variables remain 
insignificant.
The results for the two sub-periods confirm our overall regression results. The 
change o f closed-end fund discounts (the investor sentiment) is negatively related to the 
REIT risk premium. The coefficients o f the change o f closed-end fund discounts are 
significant in both the univariate and multivariate regressions. This relationship is more 
prominent in the latter part o f our sample period. However, the change in REIT 
institutional ownership seems does not help in explaining the REIT risk premium at all.
Given the wide range o f the sample REIT capitalization, we also examine the 
hypotheses by sorting the sample REITs into three size portfolios: small-size REITs, mid­
size REITs, and large-size REITs. Each portfolio consists o f one-third o f the sample 
REITs. Equal-weighted return series and institutional ownership series are created for 
each group. The REITs included in each group are rebalanced annually. The regression 
results are provided in Table 3.7.
[Insert Table 3.7 Here]
In general, the results for the mid-size and large-size portfolios have the same 
pattern with those o f the entire sample. The coefficients of the change in closed-end fund 
discounts are negative and significant at the 1% or 5% level. The Fama-French three 
factors are significant at the 1% level. None of the coefficients o f the change in REIT 
institutional ownership and interest rates is significant.
The major departure o f our size-sorted REIT portfolio regression results occurs 
with the small-size portfolio. First, the coeffieients o f the change in REIT institutional 
ownership are positive and significant at the 5% or 10% level. This supports our second 
hypothesis that REIT risk premium is positively related to the change o f REIT
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institutional ownership. It shows that for small REITs, the increase (decrease) of 
institutional ownership is associated with a higher (lower) REIT risk premium. The 
results are consistent with Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) who find a positive 
correlation between changes in institutional holdings and contemporaneously excess 
retums for small stocks. This statistically significant relationship highlights the influence 
o f institutional investors among small REITs. The information contained in change of 
institutional ownership is also independent to those included in various control variables.
The significance o f institutional ownership changes on small-size REIT premium 
implies that the influence of institutional ownership is more important for the small-size 
REITs. Given that small REITs are less followed by analysts and less known to 
individual investors, institutional ownership may serve as a positive signal and cause a 
positive impact on REIT retums.
Second, the coefficients o f the change in closed-end fund discounts are negative 
but not significant in equation (3.7) and (3.8), where we include Fama-French three 
factors as the control variables. It seems that these three factors along with the 
institutional ownership change (plus interest rates in equation 3.8) outweigh the effect o f 
the investor sentiment for the small-size REITs. Third, the interest rates, default spread 
and term spread, are significant at the 5% or 10% level for explaining small-size REIT 
portfolio retums. This is consistent with Swanson, Theis, and Casey (2002). The results 
show that small REIT excess retums are more sensitive to the interest rates.
In Table 3.8, we examine the relation between REIT risk premium and changes of 
closed-end fund discounts and REIT institutional ownership by sorting the REITs into 
three portfolios by their performance.
For each REIT in our sample, we get its constant term, alpha, using a univariate 
regression model with monthly data. The dependent variable is the excess retum of REIT, 
and the independent variable is the excess retum of the NAREIT domestic index 
(r,., = a  + + s ) .  The number o f observations varies for each REIT because o f the
availability o f the retum data in the whole sample period from October 1994 to December 
2001.
We sort the sample REITs into three alpha based portfolios: low-alpha REITs, 
mid-alpha REITs, and high-alpha REITs. Each o f the portfolios consists of one-third of
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the sample REITs. The REITs included in each group are rebalanced annually. Equal- 
weighted portfolio retums series and institutional ownership series are created for each 
group. The low-alpha group is interpreted as poor performance REITs, while the high- 
alpha group is interpreted as good performance REITs. Thus we are interested in whether 
the changes o f investor sentiment and REIT institutional ownership have different effects 
on risk premium of good or poor performing REITs.
[Insert Table 3.8 Here]
The results in Table 3.8 are again similar to those reported earlier. All but two 
coefficients o f changes in closed-end fund discounts are negative and significant at the 
1% level. The exceptions occur when we include the Fama-French three factors for the 
low-alpha REIT portfolio. None o f the coefficients o f the REIT institutional ownership 
changes is significant at the 10% level. The coefficients of Fama-French three factors all 
are positive and significant at the 1% level.
The findings indieate that the performance of a REIT is irrelevant to the effects of 
changes in closed-end fund discounts and REIT institutional ownership on REIT risk 
premium. No matter the REIT performance is good, poor, or moderate, the REIT risk 
premium is negatively related to changes in investor sentiment. This supports Hypothesis 
1. Hypothesis 2 is not supported for all three groups. We do not find significant relation 
between REIT risk premium and institutional ownership changes whether the REITs are 
good, poor, or moderate performers.
For the interest rates, the coefficients are insignificant for the low-alpha and mid­
alpha REITs. However, most o f the interest rate coefficients are significant at the 10% 
level for the high-alpha REITs. It seems the REITs with better performance are more 
sensitive to interest rates.
Consistent with the overall regression, the models with the change in closed-end 
fimd discounts have a higher Adjusted R-Square than those without it, and the models 
with Fama-French three factors have the highest Adjusted R-Squares in each group.
In conclusion, the results from Table 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 support our Hypothesis 
1 and do not support Hypothesis 2 except for small REITs. A change in investor 
sentiment, proxy by the change o f domestic equity closed-end fund discounts, is 
significantly related to REIT portfolio excess retums. When investors become more
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optimistic (a decrease in closed-end fund discounts), REIT retums are higher. In contrast, 
when the investors are more pessimistic (an increase in closed-end fimd discounts), REIT 
retums are lower. The information contained in the change o f closed-end fund discounts 
is independent o f that of other control variahles. On the other hand, we do not find a 
significant relationship between the change o f institutional ownership and REIT retums 
except for small-size REITs. For small REITs, the risk premium is positively related to 
the change o f institutional ownership. When institutional investors increase (decrease) 
their small-size REIT shareholdings, the small-size REIT risk premium tends to be higher 
(lower). The information carried by institutional ownership change is also independent o f 
that o f other control variables.
3.5.2 Causality Results
Unlike the regressions in the previous section that examine the contemporaneous 
relations between REIT risk premium and changes in closed-end fund discount and REIT 
institutional ownership, the Granger-causality test focuses on the information from 
lagged variables, or past information.
The results o f the Granger-causality test between REIT risk premium and change 
in closed-end fund discounts are reported in Table 3.9. There are three parts o f the test: 
univariate test, multivariate test with interest rates as control variables, and multivariate 
test with the Fama-French three factors as control variables.
[Insert Table 3.9 Here]
Panel A of Table 3.9 reports the univariate Granger-causality test between REIT 
risk premium and the change in closed-end fund discounts. Most o f the results are 
insignificant, that is, we do not find the past changes in closed-end fund discounts help in 
explaining the REIT risk premium. The only exceptions are the mid-alpha and high-alpha 
REITs. For these good or average performing REITs, the past changes in investor 
sentiment do affect REIT risk premium. We get similar results from Panel B where we 
include interest rates as control variahles. In Panel B, Granger causality exists only for 
mid-alpha REITs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
Unlike Panel A and Panel B, Panel C provides stronger evidence o f the influence 
o f past changes o f closed-end fund discounts on REIT risk premium when we include 
Fama-French three factors as control variables. The past closed-end fund discounts 
changes help in explaining REIT risk premium for most cases: the whole sample period, 
the second sub-period (from June 1998 to December 2001), mid-size REITs, large-size 
REITs, low-alpha REITs, mid-alpha REITs, and high-alpha REITs. The results show that 
the information contained in past investor sentiment does affect REIT risk premium. That 
is, a change in closed-end fund discounts Granger causes a change in REIT risk premium.
Table 3.10 presents the results for Granger-causality test between REIT risk 
premium and change in REIT institutional ownership.
[Insert Table 3.10 Here]
No significant Granger-causality relationship is found between REIT risk 
premium and REIT institutional ownership changes except for two cases: the first sub­
period (from October 1994 to May 1998), and the high-alpha REITs. The results are 
consistent across all three panels for univariate test, multivariate test with interest rates, 
and multivariate test with the Fama-French three factors. The two exceptions show that 
REIT institutional ownership change Granger causes REIT risk premium for the whole 
sample in the sub-period from October 1994 to May 1998 and for the high-alpha REITs 
from Oct 1994 to Dec 2001.
The results from the Granger-causality test strengthen the findings in the 
contemporaneous analysis. We find the information contained in past changes o f closed- 
end fund discounts and REIT institutional ownership does affect REIT risk premium 
under certain circumstances.
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS
Although investor sentiment has been introduced to the analysis o f stock market 
behavior for decades, direct research on the relationship between share price performance 
and investor sentiment has been few. To our knowledge, there is no such study on the 
REIT industry. Given REITs are designed specifically for small investors to participate in 
real estate investment, they represent an ideal case to study the relationship between risk 
premium and investor sentiment.
This essay directly investigates the relationship between REIT risk premium and 
investor sentiment, which is proxy by the change o f domestic equity elosed-end fund 
discounts. The results show that REIT risk premium is negatively related to investor 
sentiment. When the individual investors are more optimistic, the REIT risk premium 
tends to be higher. In contrast, when the individual investors are more pessimistic, the 
REIT risk premium tends to be lower. This is consistent with the results o f Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler (1991). The Granger-causality tests also provide some evidence that the past 
changes in investor sentiment do affect REIT risk premium in some situations.
This essay also directly examines the relation between REIT risk premium and 
changes in institutional ownership. We do not find significant relationship between REIT 
risk premium and changes in institutional ownership except for small-size REITs. For 
small-size REITs, higher (lower) risk premium is associated with increasing (decreasing) 
institutional ownership. A Granger causal relationship between REIT premium and past 
institutional ownership changes is found in the first sub-period and for the high-alpha 
REIT portfolio.
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The vector autoregressive (VAR) is commonly used for analyzing the dynamic 
impact o f random disturbances on the system o f variables. In general, the structural 
approach to simultaneous equations modeling uses economic theory to describe the 
relationships between several variables o f interest. However, economic theory is often 
not rich enough to provide a tight specification o f the dynamic relationship between 
several variables. The VAR approach sidesteps the need for structural modeling by 
modeling every endogenous variable in the system as a function o f the lagged values o f 
all of the endogenous variables in the system.
In this appendix, we discuss how we used VAR approach to identify and estimate 
the price-pressure effect parameter 0. Let’s consider a three-by-one vector z, consisting
of stock retums, , changes in cash flows, A J ,, and changes in REIT equity fund flows, 
, (i.e., ẑ  = [/2̂ ,AJ,, Agj(fJ'). We estimate the following trivariate VAR model with 
m legs, VAR {m),
A,,{L) 4 A I )  A,,{L)
A„(L) A ,,(L ) A ,,{L)
A,,{L) A ,,{L) A ,,{L)
'K
(A-1) AJ, =
A ^ fft .
Ar/,_j + ^2,
A ^fft-i. _
where L is the lag operator (i.e., ) and
m
k = \
By stacking variables, equation (A-1) can be written compactly as 
(A-2) Zj = / f z , _ j , 
where
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A , A u
0
0
A d , «2,
A<f ,_i
, u,  =
0
l~m=\ 0




r Oh 0.": 012 afi aZ a ,3 fl|3 „ m Ol3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oji 021 a- a 22 022 02™ a 23 0J3 • _ ma 22
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 . 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 . 0 .
0 0 0
0
®31 O31 03” 032 032 < O33 033 • 03”
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
n 0 1 0 0
0 . 0
0
Letting Cj for j = 1, 2, and 3 be the (1x3m) row vector with one in the [(j - l ) m  + 
l]st column and zeros elsewhere, we can express , ISejf^ in terms o f z , ,
(A-3) h, = eiZ,, AJ, = e2Z,, = gjZ,.
Using the expectations operator that E \.'\ =  E[. \ > 0], we notice that future
u^s are orthogonal to current information,
] = 0  forj > 1 .
Therefore, using a prediction formula, we obtain 
E, [h;^j ] = E,  , and
E,_,[e,z^^A =  e, .4^ z ,_ i .
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Then, we can represent unexpected changes in variables as
{E, = e ,A \ z ,  -  Az,_,) = e,A^u,.
Similarly, we get
{E, -  = ^2 -  ^^t-x) = ’ and
{E, = e^A^'iz, -  Az^_^) = e^A^u,




This can be simplified as
(A-5) e,(l-yO/4 )■ ' «(= ( l - ^ ) e 2 ( l - P ^ ) ” ' + ^ '^ 3  
or
[gi -  2̂ ](1 -  p 4)"’ u, = 6{ê  -  ](1 -  pAy' u,.
By letting (1-pA)"' be F(= [fy] for i , j  =1, 2, and 3), equation (A-5) becomes 
k  - e 2 ]Fw, =0[e, -e^]Fu,.
Therefore, the parameter 0 in (3) can be obtained by
k  -e2]Fu, 
k  -^ i]E u ,
Similarly, the parameter y in (5) can be obtained by
[gj — ^2 ̂ Eu^
r  = e^FUf
Note that the estimates o f 0 and y are based on the rational expectations 
relationship between expected future retums and expected future cash flows, treating 
retums, cash flows, and REIT equity fimd flows as endogenous in a VAR framework. 
Therefore, we did not distinguish between the right- and left- hand-side variables in a 
regression and our approach does not suffer from the endogeneity problem. In addition, 
shocks to equity fund flows are computed conveniently by innovations (or one-step- 
ahead forecast errors) in these variables (i.e., Mj, = (E, - E^_^)Aeff,) as a by-product o f 
the VAR modeling.
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Table 1.1: Estim ations o f  the Price-pressure Effect
This table provides the estimations o f the parameter o f the Price-pressure Effect 0 (or y) 
due to REIT equity fund flows*, ht is the log retums o f NAREIT index, Adt is the growth 
rate of dividends, and Aefft is the growth rate o f REIT equity fund flows. The sample 
period is from January 1993 to December 2001.
Panel A:
M  7=0 7=0
p e Standard Error f-statistic
0.992 -0.00364 0.00515 -0.70745
0.95 -0.00360 0.00515 -0.70038
0.98 -0.00363 0.00515 -0.70667
0.99 -0.00363 0.00515 -0.70677
0.995 -0.00364 0.00515 -0.70782
Panel B:
^ n j + r ( E ,  -E ,_ ,)^ p jA e ff ,^ j
7=1 7=0 7=0
P T Standard Error f-statistic
0.992 -0.00341 0.00515 -0.66254
0.95 -0.00337 0.00514 -0.65550
0.98 -0.00340 0.00515 -0.66171
0.99 -0.00340 0.00515 -0.66185
0.995 -0.00341 0.00515 -0.66295
*: Both Akaike and Schwarz information criteria suggest one lag in the estimation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
Table 1.2: U nit Root Test
eff  =  REIT equity fund flow s, /S.eff =  first-difference o f  REIT equity fund flow s, R eff = 
norm alized REIT equity fund flow s calculated by dividing REIT equity fund flow s by the total 
REIT market capitalization in the previous month. A R eff =  first-difference o f  normalized REIT 
equity fund flow s, NAREIT =  NAREIT total index, A NAREIT =  first-difference o f  NAREIT  
indexes, dividend  =  N AREIT total index dividend, A Z) =  first-difference o f  dividends, earnings = 
NAREIT total index earnings, A E = first-difference o f  earnings, Tbill = 1 -  m onth Tbill retums, 
ATbill =  first-difference o f  Tbill, h =  NAREIT index retums. Sample period is from January 1993 
to Decem ber 2001.
Variables k=2
ADF (k) Test Statistic 
A=3 it=4
eff -2.151 -1.866 -2.151
A c # -8.884*** -5.726*** -5.296***
Reff -1.778 -1.581 -2.126
A Reff -8 711 *** -5.184*** -5.072***
NAREIT -0.603 -0.629 -0.589
A NAREIT -5.456*** -4.807*** -4.111 ***
Dividend 1.674 1.823 1.998
A D -7.060*** -6.217*** -4 942***
Earnings -1.441 -1.144 -0.785
A E -10.296*** -8.433*** -9.756***
Tbill -1.013 -1.099 -1.316
A Tbill -6.507*** -4.682*** -3.064**
h -5.593*** -4.896*** -4.298***
Note: The null hypothesis in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is that there exists a unit root in the time 
series, that is, the time series is nonstationary. For example, consider first an AR (1) process:
y, +
where /i and p are parameters and £, is assumed to be white noise. Thus Hq: p = 1 and Hi: p < 1. The test is 
carried out by estimating the equation:
Ay, = f i  + yy,̂  ̂ + e , ,
where y  = p -  1, and Hq: 7 = 0  and H| : 7 < 0  .The null hypothesis is rejected if  the ADF statistic is greater 
than the Mackiimon critical values. The Mackiimon critical values for rejection o f hypothesis o f  a unit root 
is -3.4917, -2.8882, and -2.5808 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, k is lagged differences.
*** Significant at the 1% level 
Significant at the 5% level
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Table 1.3: C ointegration Test o f  REIT Equity Fund Flows and REIT Index
e ff  = REIT equity fund flows, R eff = normalized REIT equity fund flows, NAREIT  = 
NAREIT total index. Sample period is from January 1993 to December 2001. Lag 
intervals: 1 to I
Panel A: e#and  NAREIT
Johansen Test Statistic
Hypothesized number of cointegration Eigenvalue Trace Statistic
None 0.064 7.498
At most 1 0 .0 0 2 0.27
Panel B: R eff and NAREIT
Johansen Test Statistic
Hypothesized number of cointegration Eigenvalue Trace Statistic
None 0.080 9.091
At most 1 0 .001 0.158
The critical values for rejection o f hypothesis o f none cointegration is 20.04, 15.41 at the 
1%, 5% level, respectively. The critical values for rejection o f hypothesis o f at most 1 
cointegration is 6.65, 3.76 at the 1%, 5% level, respectively.
Significant at the 1% level 
Significant at the 5% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Table 1.4: U nivariate G ranger-causality Test betw een REIT M arket Perform ance
and REIT Equity Fund Flows
eff=  REIT equity fund flows, ^  e ff = first-difference o f REIT equity fund flows, R eff=  
normalized REIT equity fund flows, A R eff -  first-difference o f normalized REIT equity 
fund flows, NAREIT  = NAREIT total index, A NAREIT = first-difference o f NAREIT 
indexes, h -  NAREIT index retums. Sample period is from January 1993 to December 
2001.
Panel A: REIT market performance and REIT equity fimd flows
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value x  causes y
A c # h 1 0.954 0.330 N o
2 3.507 0.033 Y es
3 3.272 0.024 Y es
4 2.388 0.056 N o
A c # A NAREIT 1 0.546 0.461 N o
2 3.052 0.051 N o
3 2.925 0.037 Y es
4 2.270 0.067 N o
h A c # 1 8.657 0.004 Y es
2 4.904 0.009 Y es
3 5.221 0 .0 0 2 Y es
4 3.654 0.008 Y es
A NAREIT A c # 1 10.894 0 .001 Y es
2 5.901 0.003 Y es
3 5.765 0.001 Y es
4 3.857 0.006 Y es
Panel B: REIT market performance and normalized REIT equity fund flows
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
ARC# h 1 2.641 0.107 N o
3 3.096 0.030 Y es
ARC# A NAREIT 1 1.019 0.315 N o
3 1.961 0.124 N o
h ARC# 1 0.171 0.680 N o
3 1.393 0.249 N o
A NAREIT ARC# 1 0.714 0.399 N o
3 1.028 0.383 N o
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Table 1.5: U nivariate G ranger-causality Test betw een REIT M arket Perform ance
and N orm alized REIT Equity Fund Flows in Sub Sample Period
Reff=  normalized REIT equity fund flows, A Reff=  first-difference o f normalized REIT 
equity fund flows, NAREIT = NAREIT total index, A NAREIT = first-difference of 
NAREIT indexes, h = NAREIT index retums. Sample period is from January 1997 to 
December 2001.
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
ER eff h 1 0.001 0.973 No
2 0.623 0.540 No
3 0.952 0.422 No
4 0.742 0.567 No
^ R e ff E NAREIT 1 0 .0 0 2 0.962 No
2 0.710 0.495 No
3 1.044 0.380 No
4 0.857 0.495 No
h ^ R e ff 1 8.795 0.004 Yes
2 3.956 0.024 Yes
3 3.402 0.024 Yes
4 2.356 0.065 No
A NAREIT ^ R e ff 1 8.535 0.004 Yes
2 3.804 0.028 Yes
3 3.330 0.026 Yes
4 2.284 0.072 No
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Table 1.6; M ultivariate Granger-causality Test (w ith REIT Equity Fund Flows)
This table presents multivariate Granger-causality Test for the sample period January 1993 to 
December 2001. h is the retums of NAREIT index, A D is the first-difference of dividends, GD is 
the growth rate of dividends, A £  is the first-difference of eamings, GE is the growth rate of 
eamings, A T-bill is the first-difference of 1-month T-hill rates, GTB is the growth rate of 1- 
month T-bill rates, A eff is the first-difference of REIT equity fund flows.
Panel A: Granger-causality Test from REIT equity fund flows to REIT index retums
m m m m m
k = «o + ̂ ct^farning,_i + '^a,iTbill,_i +
1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1
Hot = 0, for V i (REIT equity fund flows do not Granger-cause NAREIT Index retums)
A eff (x) Dividend Eamings T-Bill lags D-stafistic /7-value X causes h
A e# AD AD A T-bill 1 0.802 0.423 No
2 2.599 0.079 No
3 2.631 0.054 No
4 2.188 0.077 No
A # GD GE GTB 1 0.704 0.482 No
2 2.011 0.139 No
3 2.381 0.074 No
4 1.619 0.177 No
Panel B: Granger-causality Test from REIT index retums to REIT equity fund flows
M T, = Pi,
m





+ ̂  /3ydividendj_j
iz=]
m m
+ ̂ fi,^earning_, +<̂ ,. 
1=1 1=1
Ho: A, = 0, for V i (NAREIT Index retums do not Granger-cause REIT equity fund flows)
A eff(x) Dividend Eamings T-Bill lags D-statistic /7-value h causes x
Aq(T AD AD A T-bill 1 2.791 0.006 Yes
2 5.577 0.005 Yes
3 5.414 0.001 Yes
4 5.100 0.001 Yes
A e# GD GE GTB 1 2.699 0.008 Yes
2 5.027 0.008 Yes
3 5.766 0.001 Yes
4 3.671 0.008 Yes
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Table 1.7: M ultivariate G ranger-causality Test (w ith N orm alized REIT Equity
Fund Flows)
This table presents multivariate Granger-causality Test for the sub sample period January 1997 to 
December 2001. h is the retums of NAREIT index, A D is the first-difference of dividends, GD  is 
the growth rate of dividends, A £  is the first-difference of eamings, GE is the growth rate of 
eamings, A T-bill is the first-difference of 1-month T-bill rates, GTB is the growth rate of 1- 
month T-bill rates, A R eff is the first-difference of Normalized REIT equity fund flows.
Panel A: Granger-causality Test from REIT equity fund flows to REIT index retums
m m m m m
hi = oto + +Y,a,idividend,_i +
(=1 i= \ i=\ i= \ 1=1
Hfl! CTji ^ * (Normalized REIT equity fund flows do not Granger-cause NAREIT Index
retums)
A eff (x) Dividend Eamings T-Bill lags F-statistic p-value X causes h
^ R e f f  A D A E A T-bill 1 0.094 0.925 No
2 0.307 0.736 No
3 0.945 0.426 No
4 1.131 0.357 No
A R eff GD GE GTB 1 0.161 0.872 No
2 0.107 0.898 No
3 0.764 0.520 No
4 0.639 0.637 No










Hq: = 0, for V i (NAREIT Index retums do not Granger-cause Normalized REIT equity
fund flows)
A eff (x) Dividend Eamings T-Bill lags F-statistic p-value h causes x
A R e ff A D A E A T-bill 1 2.808 0.006 Yes
2 4.666 0.013 Yes
3 3.447 0.024 Yes
4 3.792 0.011 Yes
A R eff GD GE GTB 1 2.602 0.011 Yes
2 4.814 0 .0 1 2 Yes
3 3.842 0.015 Yes
4 2.422 0.064 No
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Table 1.8; Variance D ecom position o f  REIT Equity Fund Flows
This table provides the variance decomposition o f different forms o f REIT equity fund 
flows: growth rate of REIT equity fund flows {t^eff) and normalized REIT equity fund 
flows h is the log returns o f NAREIT index, Ac? is the growth rate o f dividend.
The sample period is from January 1993 to December 2001.
Panel A: Variance Decomposition of ̂ eff.
Forecasting Period 
(Months)
S.E. h Ad Aeff
1 0.734 2.126 0.316 97.558
2 0.974 11.088 0.189 88.723
3 1.048 9.583 0.168 90.249
4 1.067 9.256 0.178 90.566
6 1.074 9.188 0 .2 1 2 90.601
9 1.075 9.175 0.213 90.612
12 1.075 9.175 0.213 90.612
24 1.075 9.175 0.213 90.612
Panel B: Variance Decomposition o f AReffi
Forecasting Period S.E. h Ad ^Reff
(Months)
1 0.01 1.231 0.060 98.087
2 0.011 1.113 0.137 98.748
3 0.013 1.467 0.462 98.069
4 0.013 1.428 0.509 98.061
6 0.014 1.448 0.463 98.087
9 0.015 1.474 0.461 98.064
12 0.016 1.480 0.458 98.060
24 0.016 1.486 0.455 98.058
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
Table 2.1: Sample D escriptive Statistics









Probability 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum 8.094226
Sum Sq. Dev. 160.6854
Observations 1821
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Table 2.2: U nit R oot Test
r ,-  daily excess return o f REIT index, r̂ p = daily excess return o f S&P 500 index, i -
daily 10 year Treasury constant maturity rate, Ai = first-difference of daily 10 year 
Treasury yield.
Variables k= 2
ADF (k) Test Statistic
k=3 k=4
n -21.069*** -19.168*** -18.368***
ŝp -26.091*** -22.215*** -20.683***
h -0.780 -0.631 -0.567
Ai, -25.573*** -22.467*** -20.687***
Note: The null hypothesis in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is that there exists a unit 
root in the time series, that is, the time series is nonstationary. For example, consider first 
an AR (1) process:
T, = A + pyt-x + >
where fi and p are parameters and s, is assumed to be white noise. Thus Hq: p = I and 
H i: p < 1. The test is carried out by estimating the equation:
Ayt = p+7yt.i + 6 t,
where 7  = p -  1, and H q: 7 = 0  and Hi: 7  < O.The null hypothesis is rejected if  the ADF 
statistic is greater than the Mackinnon critical values. The Mackinnon critical values for 
rejection of hypothesis o f a unit root is -3.4917, -2.8882, and -2.5808 at the 1%, 5%, and 
1 0 % level, respectively, k is lagged differences
*** Significant at the 1% level 
Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 2.3: C orrelation M atrix
= daily excess return o f equity REIT index, = daily excess return o f S&P 500 index, 
Ai = first-difference o f daily 10 year Treasury yield
Ai ft rsp
Ai 1 .0 0 0
rt 0.044 1 .0 0 0
rsp 0.076 0.461 1 .0 0 0


















Table 2.4: Estim ations o f  GARCH and G A RCH -M  M odels 
Model: Mean equation:
c5- = « o (2-5)
0 n = 0̂ 0 + cc.r̂ p + (2-5-1)
^ = «o + ccx̂ sp + + St (2-5-2)
/ ; = « ( , +  -I- £■( (2 .6 )
r, =  oTq +  ^ 2 -H -I- oĉ cT̂  +  (2 .6 -1 )
= «() + (2 .6 -2 )
r, =  « o  +  a ,r^^  +  +  «3r,_, +  (2 .7 )
r, =  «(, +  « j r  +  « 2 A i, +  «3r,_i +  «4< t, -f e, (2 .7 -1 )
1  n = «o + + « 2  Ai, + a^r,_, + a,cj^ + £, (2.7-2)
Variance equation:
= P o ^  P\s]-\ + PiS^]-\ (2 -8 )
r=  daily excess retum o f equity REIT index, = daily excess retum of S&P 500 index, Ai = first-difference o f daily 10 year 






C/)(/) Table 2.4 (Continued)
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*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level On00
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Table 3.1; Sample Size o f REITs and Closed-end Funds
At the end o f each year from 1993 to 2000, we identify all REITs from CRSP by SIC 
Code. Then we eliminate those REITs either without all 12 months retum data or 12 
months institutional ownership data after the screening date. The REITs after screening 
are those included in our final sample.
All REITs 
Year Identified by SIC 
Code
Without all 12 Months 
Retum Data 
During the Year
Without all 12 Months 
Institutional Ownership Data 
During the Year
After Screen
1994 73 0 3 70
1995 101 3 5 93
1996 108 14 4 90
1997 112 9 7 96
1998 148 10 23 115
1999 179 11 12 156
2000 176 9 15 152
2001 171 9 15 147
1068 65 84 919
For the closed-end funds, we include all domestic equity funds. In each sample year, we 
eliminate those Closed-end funds with missing data. We also eliminate funds that have 
excess premium larger than 100% during a year. The closed-end funds after screening are 
those included in our final sample.
Year
All Domestic Equity 
Closed-end Funds
Without all 12 Months 
Discount data 
During the Year
Funds with Excess 
Premium After Screen
1994 39 5 0 34
1995 45 12 0 33
1996 43 5 1 37
1997 43 8 0 35
1998 45 6 0 39
1999 48 5 1 42
2000 48 9 1 38
2001 44 6 0 38
355 56 3 296
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Table 3.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics o f REITs and Closed-end Fund Discounts
This table shows the descriptive statistics for individual sample data. REIT shares 
outstanding and REIT capitalization are year-end data. REIT institutional ownership and 
closed-end fund discounts data are monthly average data for each sample REIT and 











Domestic Equity Closed- 
end Fund Discounts 
(%)
Mean 30,478 674 39.142 10.432
Median 19,887 344 39.407 11.129
Maximum 414,335 12,463 91.255 42.075
Minimum 394 1 0.033 -37.642 (Premium)
Std. Dev. 37,892 1,051 25.164 10.712
Observations 919 919 919 296
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Table 3.3: D escriptive Statistics for Series in Regression A nalysis
This table represents the descriptive statistics o f the series in our regressions. R is the 
monthly excess retum of the equal-weighted portfolio o f sample REITs. JIO  is the 
monthly change o f the equal-weighted institutional ownership o f sample REITs. ADIS is 
the monthly change of the equal-weighted closed-end fund discounts. DBF  is the default 
spread, which is defined as the difference between the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate 
Bond Yield and the Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield. The term spread, 
TERM, is defined as the difference between 30-year Treasury bond rate and one-month 
T-bill rate. Rm , the excess retum on the market, is the value-weighted retum on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB, 
Small Minus Big, is the average retum on three small portfolios minus the average retum 
on three big portfolios. HML, High Minus Low, is the average retum on two value 
portfolios minus the average retum on two growth portfolios. Monthly data is from 
October 1994 to December 2001.
R AIO ADIS DBF TERM Rm SMB HML
Mean 0.954 0.039 -0.095 0.715 5.784 0.792 -0.014 0.326
Median 0.909 -0.043 0.125 0.690 5.645 1.845 -0.290 0.215
Maximum 8.683 4.618 12.810 1.280 7.710 7.940 21.380 13.670
Minimum -10.565 -5.678 -10.387 0.550 4.680 -16.120 -16.260 -12.050
Std. Dev. 3.282 1.531 2.921 0.131 0.665 4.749 4.788 4.489
Skewness -0.200 -0.099 0.359 1.347 0.651 -0.890 0.863 0.242
Kurtosis 3.971 5.539 7.303 5.770 3.043 3.841 7.716 3.915
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
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Table 3.4: Correlation M atrix
R is the monthly excess retum of the equal-weighted portfolio o f sample REITs. AIO  is 
the monthly change o f the equal-weighted institutional ownership o f sample REITs. ADIS 
is the monthly change o f the equal-weighted closed-end fund discounts. DEF  is the 
default spread, which is defined as the difference between the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa 
Corporate Bond Yield and the Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield. The term 
spread, TERM, is defined as the difference between 30-year Treasury bond rate and one- 
month T-bill rate. R m , the excess retum on the market, is the value-weighted retum on 
all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB, 
Small Minus Big, is the average retum on three small portfolios minus the average retum 
on three big portfolios. HML, High Minus Low, is the average retum on two value 
portfolios minus the average retum on two growth portfolios. Monthly data is fi*om 
October 1994 to December 2001.
R AIO ADIS DEF TERM Rm SMB HML
R 1
AIO -0.025 1
ADIS -0.385 -0.139 1
DEF 0.041 -0.089 -0.017 1
TERM 0.059 0.040 0.101 -0.560 1
Rm 0.373 -0.043 -0.455 -0.047 0.078 1
SMB 0.250 -0.131 -0.082 0.044 0.023 0.192 1
HML 0.024 0.147 0.239 -0.023 -0.051 -0.625 -0.588 1
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Table 3.6: Regression Results in Two Sub Sam ple Periods
Rf -  a  + p  ADIS, + £,
R, -  a  + Y AIO, + £,
R , ^ a  + p  ADIS, + 0 DEF, + A TERM, + s,
R , ^ a  + r  AIO, + 0  DEF, +  A TERM, + s,
R, = a - \-  p  ADIS, + Y AIO, + s,
R , ^ a  + p  A D IS ,+ y  ^ O , + 0  D E F ,+ A T E R M ,+ £ ,








R, = a  + p  ADIS, + Y AIO, + 0 DEF, +  A TERM, + rj Rm, + p  SMB, + pHML, +  s, (3.8) 
Sample period 1: October 1994 to May 1998
Equation a P y 0 V P A djusted
R -Square
(3 .1 ) 1 .404***
(3 .5 2 3 )
-0 .3 5 1 *
(-1 .8 4 0 )
0 .0 5 4
(3 .2 ) 1 .367***
(3 .2 9 3 )
0 .1 1 8
(0 .5 0 7 )
0 .0 1 8
(3 .3 ) -4 .1 5 8
(-0 .6 1 6 )
-0 .3 5 9 *
(-1 .8 6 9 )
10.433
(1 .1 7 2 )
-0 .1 6 0
(-0 .2 1 7 )
0 .0 3 9
(3 .4 ) -4 .6 5 6
(-0 .6 6 0 )
0 .1 6 2
(0 .6 8 2 )
10.838
(1 .1 5 8 )
-0 .1 2 8
(-0 .1 6 7 )
0 .0 3 4
(3 .5 ) 1 .398***
(3 .4 4 8 )
-0 .3 4 4 *
(-1 .7 4 7 )
0 .033
(0 .1 4 0 )
0 .0 3 0
(3 .6 ) -4 .4 3 7
(-0 .6 4 5 )
-0 .3 4 6 *
(-1 .7 4 0 )
0 .0 7 7
(0 .3 2 4 )
10.903
(1 .1 9 5 )
-0 .1 6 4
(-0 .2 2 0 )
0 .0 1 7
(3 .7 ) 0 .6 9 2
(1 .5 4 4 )
-0 .3 2 7 *
(-1 .7 8 7 )
-0 .0 6 0
(-0 .2 7 1 )
0 .4 3 3 * * *
(3 .0 1 7 )
0 .47 1 * * *
(3 .0 6 5 )
0 .5 2 9 * *
(2 .2 6 8 )
0 .251
(3 .8 ) -9 .2 4 7
(-1 .4 9 8 )
-0 .3 0 9 *
(-1 .7 1 6 )
-0 .0 0 7
(-0 .0 3 0 )
13.914*
(1 .7 4 7 )
0 .171
(0 .2 6 4 )
0 .4 8 7 * * *
(3 .3 4 8 )
0 .46 7 * * *
(3 .0 9 2 )
0 .5 7 8 * *
(2 .4 8 6 )
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Equation a P Y 0 X V P A djusted
R -Square
(3 .1 ) 0 .408
(0 .7 8 3 )
-0 .4 7 3 * * *
(-3 .2 1 1 )
0 .181
(3 .2 ) 0 .476
(0 .827)
-0 .501
(-1 .0 5 5 )
0 .003
(3 .3 ) -9.121
(-0 .8 2 9 )
-0 .4 9 6 * * *
(-3 .2 5 7 )
6 .405
(1 .4 6 7 )
0 .8 2 6
(0 .4 8 4 )
0 .185
(3 .4 ) 1.437
(0 .1 2 1 )
-0 .525
(-1 .0 9 3 )
4 .4 0 5
(0 .9 1 5 )
-0 .8 4 7
(-0 .4 6 0 )
0 .0 0 6
(3 .5 ) 0.341
(0 .6 6 4 )
-0 .4 9 9 * * *
(-3 .4 2 5 )
-0 .6 6 8
(-1 .5 6 7 )
0 .2 0 9
(3 .6 ) -7 .857
(-0 .7 2 4 )
-0 .5 1 7 * * *
(-3 .4 3 7 )
-0 .655
(-1 .5 3 5 )
6 .1 8 4
(1 .4 4 1 )
0 .6 0 9
(0 .3 6 2 )
0 .2 1 2
(3 .7 ) 0 .118 -0 .2 8 2 * * -0 .4 2 4 0 .4 6 9 * * * 0 .3 8 9 * * * 0 .6 4 3 * * * 0 .5 8 4
(0 .3 1 4 ) (-2 .1 8 5 ) (-1 .3 2 4 ) (4 .5 4 6 ) (4 .7 5 2 ) (5 .9 6 4 )
(3 .8 ) -4 .7 5 7 -0 .3 1 3 * * -0 .428 3 .9 1 9 0 .3 2 6 0 .4 4 1 * * * 0 .3 8 3 * * * 0 .6 3 0 * * * 0 .5 7 9
(-0 .5 7 2 ) (-2 .2 7 7 ) (-1 .3 2 8 ) (1 .2 0 9 ) (0 .2 5 3 ) (4 .1 3 7 ) (4 .5 9 7 ) (5 .7 7 1 )
■D
CD
*** S ign ificant at the 1% lev e l  
** S ign ificant at the 5% lev e l 


















Table 3.7: Regression Results w hen REITs are Sorted into Three Portfolios by  Size
/?( — oc + p  ADISj 
Rj = a  + y  AIO, + e,
R , = a  + p  ADIS, + e  DEF, + 1 TERM, + s,
R, = a  + r  AID, + e DEF, + ;i TERM, + s,
R, = a  + p  ADIS, + y AIO, + s,
R, ^ a  + p  AD IS,+y MO,+e  DEF,+XTERM ,+£,
R, -  a  p  ADIS, + y  AIO, + rj Rm, + // SMB, + pHML, + s.
( 3 .1 )
( 3 .2 )
( 3 .3 )
( 3 .4 )
(3 .5 )
( 3 .6 )
( 3 .7 )
R, = a  + p  ADIS, +  y AIO, + 6 DEF, + A TERM, + rj Rm, + p  SMB, + pHML, +  s, ( 3 .8 )  




a  P Y 0 X ■q li p A djusted
R -Square
1  (3 .1 ) 0 .9 5 3 * *  -0 .3 8 6 * * *  
(2 .3 4 3 )  (-2 .7 5 5 )
0 .0 7 2
S . (3 .2 ) 0 .9 0 7 * *  0 .5 0 9 * *  
(2 .1 8 1 )  (2 .0 6 1 )
0 .0 3 7
o  (3 .3 ) -1 4 .2 8 8 * *  -0 .4 2 3 * * *  
( -2 .3 4 4 )  (-3 .0 7 9 )
6 .5 4 9 *  1 .824**  
(1 .7 8 7 ) (2 .5 0 7 )
0 .1 1 9
^  (3 .4 )  
3
-1 2 .6 4 3 * *  0 .5 1 2 * *  
(-2 .0 2 6 )  (2 .1 0 5 )
6 .2 6 7 *  1 .567**  
(1 .6 6 3 )  (2 .1 0 7 )
0 .0 6 8
(3-5)
o
0 .8 8 3 * *  -0 .3 6 1 * *  0 .4 5 0 *  
(2 .1 9 3 ) ( -2 .6 0 4 ) (1 .8 7 2 )
0 .0 9 9
"  (3 .6 ) -1 4 .3 5 6 * *  -0 .3 9 7 * * *  0 .4 4 5 *  
( -2 .3 9 2 )  ( -2 .9 2 6 ) (1 .9 0 2 )
6 .7 3 8 *  1 .801**  
(1 .8 6 6 )  (2 .5 1 4 )
0 .1 4 6
(3 .7 ) 0 .3 7 9  -0 .1 3 2  0 .4 8 9 * *  
(1 .0 5 4 ) ( -0 .9 9 5 )  (2 .3 6 3 )
0 .4 6 5 * * *  0 .4 4 3 * * *  0 .4 8 1 * * *  
(4 .4 1 5 )  (4 .7 7 1 ) (3 .8 7 2 )
0 .3 4 6
(3 .8 ) -1 3 .0 6 1 * *  -0 .1 7 6  0 .4 8 4 * *  
( -2 .5 4 3 ) ( -1 .3 5 1 ) (2 .4 1 1 )
6 .5 0 9 * *  1 .519**  
(2 .1 1 4 )  (2 .4 7 2 )
0 .4 5 2 * * *  0 .4 3 5 * * *  0 .4 9 0 * * *  
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Equation a P Y 0 I P A djusted
R -Square
(3 .1 ) 1.022**
(2 .5 6 1 )
-0 .4 3 6 * * *
(-3 .1 7 6 )
0 .0 9 7
(3 .2 ) 1 .065**
(2 .5 2 2 )
-0 .033
(-0 .2 0 1 )
0.011
(3 .3 ) -3 .351
(-0 .5 4 2 )
-0 .4 5 0 * * *
(-3 .2 3 6 )
0 .9 0 2
(0 .2 4 3 )
0 .6 4 4
(0 .8 7 3 )
0 .0 8 4
(3 .4 ) -1 .4 1 0
(-0 .2 1 6 )
-0 .0 3 7
(-0 .2 2 3 )
0 .3 2 6
(0 .0 8 3 )
0 .3 8 8
(0 .4 9 8 )
0 .0 3 2
(3 .5 ) 1 .023**
(2 .5 5 3 )
-0 .4 4 4 * * *
(-3 .2 0 0 )
-0 .0 8 4
(-0 .5 3 3 )
0 .0 8 9
(3 .6 ) -3 .4 6 6
(-0 .5 5 8 )
-0 .4 5 9 * * *
(-3 .2 6 6 )
-0 .093
(-0 .5 8 1 )
0 .9 0 0
(0 .2 4 1 )
0 .6 6 4
(0 .8 9 6 )
0 .0 7 7
(3 .7 ) 0 .3 5 6
(1 .0 5 3 )
-0 .2 6 7 * *
(-2 .1 1 5 )
-0 .0 4 7
(-0 .3 6 6 )
0 .5 4 8 * * *
(4 .8 9 2 )
0 .4 0 2 * * *
(4 .6 1 3 )
0 .7 8 0 * * *
(6 .6 5 3 )
0 .411
(3 .8 ) -3 .998
(-0 .7 9 5 )
-0 .2 8 7 * *
(-2 .2 1 8 )
-0 .055
(-0 .4 2 3 )
1 .582
(0 .5 2 5 )
0 .5 5 8
(0 .9 2 5 )
0 .5 4 0 * * *
(5 .3 2 3 )
0 .4 0 0 * * *
(4 .5 5 2 )
0 .7 8 1 * * *
(6 .6 1 0 )
0 .4 0 2
*** S ign ificant at the 1% lev e l 
** S ign ifican t at the 5%  lev e l 

















Table 3.8: Regression Results w hen REITs are Sorted into Three Portfolios by  T heir Perform anee
R, =a->r p  ADIS, +  £,
R, -  a  + y  AIO, +  s ,
R, = a  + p  ADIS, +  6  DEF, +  A TERM , +  s ,
R, = a  + y  AIO, +  d DEF, +  X TE R M , +  s ,
R, -  a -Y  p  ADIS, +  Y AJO, +  s ,
R , = a  +  p  A D I S ,+ r  AIO, + 9  DEF, + X T E R M , + s ,








R, -  a-\- P  ADIS, +  Y AIO, +  9  DEF, +  X TERM , +  rj Rm, +  p  SMB, +  pH M L, +  s, (3.8) 
L o w -a lp h a  R E I T  p o r t fo lio
5 ' Equation  
■o
a  P Y e X 7) 11 p A djusted
R -Square
i  (3 -1 )
C T
-0 .0 6 2  -0 .4 5 3 * * *  
(-0 .1 4 6 ) ( -3 .0 9 6 )
0 .0 9 2
o  (3 -2 )
Q .
-0 .013  0 .0 4 8  
(-0 .0 2 9 ) (0 .1 8 1 )
0 .0 1 2
5  (3 .3 )
o
c
-5 .741 -0 .4 7 0 * * *  
(-0 .8 7 4 ) ( -3 .1 7 6 )
1 .486  0 .7 9 8  
(0 .3 7 6 )  (1 .0 1 7 )
0 .0 8 2
(3 -4 )
CD
-3 .783  0 .0 5 4  
(-0 .5 4 5 ) (0 .2 0 1 )
0 .9 6 6  0 .5 3 2  
(0 .2 3 0 ) (0 .6 4 4 )
0 .031
i .  (3 .5 )
C/) ^  ^  
C/)
-0 .0 7 4  -0 .4 6 2 * * *  -0 .0 8 8  
(-0 .1 7 2 ) ( -3 .0 9 3 ) ( -0 .3 4 6 )
0 .0 8 2
§  (3 .6 ) -5 .6 2 2  -0 .4 7 8 * * *  -0 .0 8 4  
(-0 .8 5 0 ) ( -3 .1 6 9 ) ( -0 .3 2 7 )
1 .378 0 .7 8 9  
(0 .3 4 6 )  (0 .9 9 9 )
0 .0 7 2
(3 .7 ) -0 .7 3 7 * *  -0 .1 8 6  -0 .0 7 6  
(-2 .0 0 0 ) ( -1 .3 4 3 ) ( -0 .3 5 8 )
0 .6 1 2 * * *  0 .4 5 3 * * *  0 .6 5 1 * * *  
(5 .6 8 1 ) (4 .7 8 5 )  (5 .0 7 9 )
0 .3 8 4
(3 .8 ) -4 .611 -0 .2 0 2  -0 .0 7 4  
(-0 .8 4 3 ) ( -1 .4 2 2 ) ( -0 .3 4 2 )
1 .470  0 .4 8 8  
(0 .4 4 7 )  (0 .7 4 6 )
0 .6 0 6 * * *  0 .4 5 1 * * *  0 .6 5 3 * * *  
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Equation a P Y 0 X V P A djusted
R -Square
(3 .1 ) 1 .526***
(4 .5 6 0 )
-0 .4 2 0 * * *
(-3 .6 4 5 )
0 .126
(3 .2 ) 1 .509***
(4 .1 8 1 )
0 .2 3 2
(1 .1 1 6 )
0 .003
(3 .3 ) -9 .8 0 1 *
(-1 .9 3 9 )
-0 .4 4 3 * * *
(-3 .8 9 1 )
6 .0 3 0 *
(1 .9 8 4 )
1 .212**
(2 .0 0 9 )
0 .1 5 7
(3 .4 ) -8 .488
(-1 .5 6 1 )
0 .272
(1 .3 1 1 )
5 .9 6 6 *
(1 .8 1 2 )
0 .9 8 9
(1 .5 2 9 )
0 .0 2 2
(3 .5 ) 1 .488***
(4 .3 9 4 )
-0 .4 1 0 * * *
(-3 .5 3 3 )
0 .1 6 0
(0 .8 1 6 )
0 .123
(3 .6 ) -1 0 .2 0 2 * *
(-2 .0 1 3 )
-0 .4 3 1 * * *
(-3 .7 6 8 )
0 .1 9 7
(1 .0 1 8 )
6 .3 7 6 * *
(2 .0 8 5 )
1.230**
(2 .0 3 9 )
0 .1 5 8
(3 .7 ) 1.037***
(3 .5 2 9 )
-0 .3 0 0 * * *
(-2 .7 7 2 )
0.101
(0 .6 0 9 )
0 .3 6 8 * * *
(4 .2 4 9 )
0 .4 0 4 * * *
(5 .3 4 5 )
0 .5 8 0 * * *
(5 .6 8 2 )
0 .393
(3 .8 ) -1 0 .2 1 2 * *
(-2 .4 4 1 )
-0 .3 2 8 * * *
(-3 .0 9 3 )
0 .1 3 7
(0 .8 5 2 )
6 .5 0 8 * *
(2 .5 8 8 )
1.138**
(2 .2 7 9 )
0 .3 6 1 * * *
(4 .2 8 8 )
0 .3 9 8 * * *
(5 .4 5 2 )
0 .5 8 8 * * *





W e first get constant term, alpha, for each individual REIT from  a  univariate regression: dependent variable is  the e x c e ss  retum  o f  REIT; independent variable is  the e x cess  retum  
o f  N A R E IT  d om estic  index. M onthly  data. Then w e  sort the R E IT s b y  their alphas. T hree REIT portfo lios are form ed and equal-w eighted  portfo lio  retum s and institutional 
ow nership  series are calculated. T he R EITs in  each  p ortfo lio  are rebalanced annually.
*** S ign ifican t at the 1% lev e l  
** S ign ifican t at the 5%  level 
* S ign ifican t at the 10% level
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Table 3.9; G ranger-causality Test betw een REIT R isk Prem ium  and Changes in
C losed-end Fund D iscounts
A: Univariate Granger-causality Test: ^ = a   ̂ a  ^.R a   ̂ ADIS + e  C -9)
1=1 1=1
A-1: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_____________________________________________________
(x) F-statistic p -v a lu e X causes y






A-2: (Sub sam ple period  O ct 1994 to M ay 1998)
M . M . la g s F -s ta t is t ic p-value X causes






A-3; (Sub sam ple period  Jun 1998 to D ec 2001)
(x) la g s F -s ta t is t ic p-value X c a u s e s  y






A-4: with Sm all-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________
 (x )________________ (jO_____________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic _____________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






A-5: with M id s ize  REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)__________
 (x )________________ (y )_____________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic _____________p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






A-6: with Large-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________
 (x )________________ (y )_____________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic _____________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






A-7: with Low-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)________
(x )____________________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic _____________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






A-8: with M id-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________
 (x )____________________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic _____________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






A-9: with High-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)________
 ( x )____________________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic _____________ p -v a lu e __________ x  e a u s e s  y
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B: M ultivariate Granger-causality Test with Interest Rates as Control Variables:
m m m m
i=\ (=1 1=1
B-1: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)______
1=1







B-2: (Sub sam ple period  O ct 1994 to M ay 1998)







B-3: (Sub sam ple period  Jun 1998 to D ec 2001)







B-4: with Small-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________







B-5: with M id-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)__________







B-6: with Large-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________







B-7: with Low-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)_________







B-8: with M id-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________







B-9: with High-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)________
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C: M ultivariate Granger-causality Test with Fama-French Three Factors as Control Variables:
m m m m m
R t  = « o  + Y , a , , H M L , _ .  + s ,  (3.11)
i= i i= l j=l 1=1
C-1: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-valuc X causes y
ADIS R 1 1.334 0.186 N o
3 4.146 0.009 Yes
C-2: (Sub sam ple period  O ct 1994 to M ay 1998)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-valuc X causes y
ADIS R 1 0.417 0.679 No
3 0.575 0.637 N o
C-3: (Sub sam ple period  Jun 1998 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
ADIS R 1 1.064 0.294 No
3 3.304 0.035 Yes
C-4: with Sm all-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-valuc X causes y
ADIS R-small 1 0.220 0.827 N o
3 0.878 0.457 No
C-5: with M id s ize  REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-valuc X  causes y
ADIS R-middle 1 1.189 0.238 No
3 4.037 0.011 Yes
C-6: with Large-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-valuc X causes y
ADIS R-large 1 1.394 0.167 N o
3 5.018 0.003 Yes
C-7: with Low-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-valuc X  causes y
ADIS R-low 1 0.459 0.647 N o
3 2.785 0.047 Yes
(X) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X  causes y






C-9: with High-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  Oct 1994 to Dec2001)
(X) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X  causes y
ADIS R-high 1 1.667 0.099 Yes
2.040 0.117 No
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Table 3.10: G ranger-causality Test betw een REIT Risk Prem ium  and Changes in
REIT Institutional Ownership
A: Univariate Granger-causality Test: ^  -
m rn
« o  + Z  + z a ^ f A I O , (3.12)
A-1: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F'-statistic p-value X causes y
AIO R 1 0.423 0.517 No
3 0.487 0.692 No
A-2: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to M ay 1998)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AIO R 1 3.937 0.054 Yes
3 2.552 0.072 Yes
A-3: (Sample period  Jun 1998 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AIO R 1 0.707 0.405 No
3 0.398 0.755 No
A-4: with Sm all-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AlO-small R-small 1 0.385 0.536 N o
3 0.176 0.912 No
A-5: with M id s ize  REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AlO-middle R-middle 1 0.299 0.586 No
3 0.119 0.949 No
A-6: with Large-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AlO-large R-large 1 0.273 0.603 No
3 0.733 0.535 No
A-7: with Low-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AIO-low R-low 1 0.119 0.731 No
3 0.340 0.797 No
A-8: with M id-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AlO-mid R-mid 1 0.127 0.723 No
3 1.115 0.348 No
A-9: with High-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  Oct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y
AlO-high R-high 1 3.624 0.060 Yes
1.473 0.228 N o
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B: M ultivariate Granger-causality Test with Interest Rates as Control Variables 
^ ,  =  «0 +  Z  +  Z  « 2, A / 0 ,_,. +  Z  a , i D E F  +  ^  a  , iTERM  +  s ,
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B-1: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X eauses y






B-2: (Sub sam ple period  O ct 1994 to M ay 1998)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y






B-3: (Sub sam ple period  Jun 1998 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y






B-4: with Sm all-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y






B-5: with M id s ize  REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X  causes y






B-6: with Large-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y






B-7: with Low-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)
(x) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X causes y






(X) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X  causes y






B-9: with High-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  Oct 1994 to D ec 001)
(X) (y) lags F-statistic p-value X  causes y
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C: M ultivariate Granger-causality Test with Fama-French Three Factors as Control Variables
^ ,  =  « o  +  Z  +  Z  « 2 i A / 0 , _ ,  +  Z  a , i R m  ^  a^^SMB  ^  a  „ H M L  +  £,
C-1: (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)
i 5 l izL la g s F-statistic p-value X causes y






C-2: (Sub sam ple period  O ct 1994 to M ay 1998)
la g s F -s ta t is t ic p -v a lu e X c a u s e s  y






C-3: (Sub sam ple period  Jun 1998 to D ec 2001)
M . M . la g s F -s ta t is t ic p -v a lu e X c a u s e s  y






C-4: with Small-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)_________
 (x )_________________^ ____________ la g s___________F -s ta t is t ic ____________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






C-5: with M id-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to D ec 2001)__________
 (x )____________________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic ______________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






C-6: with Large-size REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)_________
 (x )________________ ()0 ____________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic ______________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






C-7: with Low-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)_________
(x )_________________(y )____________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic ______________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






C-8: with M id-alpha REIT Port:folio Risk Premium (Sample period  O ct 1994 to Dec2001)_________
 (x )____________________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic ______________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y






C-9: with High-alpha REIT Portfolio Risk Premium (Sample period  Oct 1994 to Dec2001)________
 ( x )____________________ la g s________ F -s ta t is t ic ______________ p -v a lu e __________ x  c a u s e s  y
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Figure 1.2: REIT Equity Offering
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Figure 1.3: M onthly REIT Equity Fund Flows and M arket Index
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■Normalized REIT Equity Fund Flow (% • NAREIT Index
Source: National Association o f Real Estate Investment Trusts
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B: Numbers of different types of REITs
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Note: Market capitalization equals price o f shares multiplied by the number o f shares 
outstanding. EREIT: equity REIT, MREIT: mortgage REIT, HREIT: hybrid REIT.
Source: National Association o f Real Estate Investment Trusts
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Figure 3.1: REIT Returns, REIT Institutional O w nership, and C losed-end Fund 
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Note: REIT Retum is the monthly retum of the equal-weighted portfolio o f sample 
REITs. REIT Institutional Ownership is the equal-weighted monthly institutional 
ownership o f sample REITs. Closed-end Fund discounts is the equal-weighted monthly 
discotmt o f sample closed-end funds. All data are in percentage.
Source: CRSP and Standard and Poor’s Security Owner’s Stock Guide
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